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Publicatii » Brief Analysis » Relatiile Israelului cu vecinii sai: incotro?

 Relatiile Israelului cu vecinii sai: incotro?



Randurile care urmeaza sunt inspirate de parcurgerea forumului unei analize a editiei de duminica 11 septembrie a ziarului israelian ‘Haaretz’. Intitulata ‘Crises with Turkey and Egypt represent a political tsunami for Israel’, aceasta analiza arata ca a devenit realitate o ampla criza politica inainte ca palestinienii sa-si declare propriul stat independent si ca astfel “Israel se afla izolat in fata Iranului, Turciei si Egiptului” ( Analiza (bineinteles ca m-a trimis si la parcurgerea altor texte din presa internationala) porneste de la doua dintre cele mai recente evolutii in dinamica extrem de accelerata a Orientului Mijlociu: prima este, cea mai recenta, atacul asupra ambasadei israeliene din Cairo si evacuarea cu sprijinul comandourilor egiptene, in fata multimii dezlantuite, a ambasadorului si personalului ambasadei si transportarea la aeroport pentru a fi preluati de un avion militar israelian; secunda evolutia refera la criza intetita zi de zi saptamana trecuta intre Turcia si Israel, declansata de publicarea raportului Palmer al UN referitor la oprirea violenta a flotilei in mai 2010, care a incercat sa sparga blocada maritima israeliana a Gazei (incident soldat cu moartea a 9 etnici turci, unul dintre ei cetatean american, precum si ranirea a 9 soldati israelieni). Turcia, prin vocea premierului Erdogan a anuntat ca nu recunoaste calificarea de catre acest raport a blocadei israeliene ca “legitima” si ca va sesiza Curtea Penala Internationala de la Haga in acest sens, deopotriva ca in viitor astfel de incercari vor fi aparate de flota turca, in plus aceasta avand ca misiune sa monitorizeze apele internatioanle din Estul Mediteranei pentru a interzice Israelului un pretins monopol asupra rezervelor din adancuri.

Acesta atitudine neasteptata a premierului Turciei a primit diverse interpretari, de la aceea referitoare la urmarirea unui design “neotoman” si “islamist’ la aceea care considera ca exista o stransa legatura intre preluarea recenta a controlului asupra armatei de catre guvern si noul dinamism extern. Din acest ultim punct de vedere este de mentionat comentariul saptamanalului conservator britanic “The Economist”: 'Israeli-Turkish relations have suffered in part because of Mr Erdogan’s determination to reduce his generals' influence on foreign policy. In the past, keeping Israel close has allowed the army to cosy up to America. But the rise to power of Mr Erdogan’s mildly Islamist Justice and Development (AK) party and the exposure of mischief by soldiers—from coup plotting and corruption to incompetence in the field—has changed that. Cooling relations with Israel was a part of it. Israel’s assault on Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009 enraged many of AK’s pious supporters. And AK was and remains keen to have warmer relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds.” (“Can it get worse?The row between Israel and Turkey is becoming increasingly bitter”, Sep 10th 2011, vezi


“Varful” crizei a fost , potrivit declaratiilor celor doua parti, vineri, intreaga evolutie fiind insa influentata de atacul multimii din Cairo asupra ambasadei statului Israel Egipit in aceeasi zi, dupa sfarsitul rugaciunii .Acest eveniment arata cat de strans legate sunt evolutiile din Mideast, intrucat este de presupus ca amordarea crizei turco-israeliene, care a atins amplitudinea maxima vineri dimineata, sa fi constituit un fundal favorabil pentru actiunea multimii cairote.

Evolutia crizei turco-palestiniene ameninta sa scape de sub controlul ambelor parti, chiar daca Israelul a facut declaratii chemand la continuarea bunelor relatii atat cu Turcia , cat si Egiptul, mentionandu-se ca Ierusalimul este interesat in relatii stabile si reluarea lor cat mai curand. Sambata si duminica au intervenit si alte declaratii de la Ankara, urmare nu doar evenimentelor de la Cairo, dar si chemarilor la “rapprochement” ale Washingtonului si Bruxellesului. Astfel, oficiali turci au declarat ca relatarile lui Erdogan privind intentia de a trimite nave militare pentru a escorta ajutoarele expediate maritim catre Gaza au fost scoase din context. Potrivit relatarilor ziarului turc ‘Zaman’ , Erdogan ar fi declarat urmatoarele: “At the moment, no doubt, Turkish warships are first of all liable to protect their own ships. This is the first step. And there is humanitarian aid, which we will extend. Our humanitarian assistance will no longer be attacked as happened in the case of the Mavi Marmara.” (Herb Keinon, Turkey says it won’t send gunboats to Gaza any time soon, 11.9.2011,

In acelasi timp, de la Jerusalem au parvenit duminica stiri referitoare la faptul ca premierul Netanyahu nu impartaseste opiniile aparute in presa ca fiind ale ministrului de Externe, Lieberman, potrivit carora Israelul ia in considerare sprijinirea miscarii iredentiste turce PKK, inclusiv furnizarea de arme, precum si strangerea legaturilor cu Armenia. Potrivit stirilor de presa, biroul premierului Netanyahu a mentionat ca politica Israelului “was and remains to prevent deterioration in ties with Turkey and [to promote] a calming of the tensions between the two countries.” (Ibidem).

Este, cel putin pentru moment, evident ca tensiunea din Orientul Mijlociu s-a risipit, desi nu pe de-a intregul. Saptamanalul britanic , citat mai sus, releva ca “The Turkish government has no intention, however, of upsetting its NATO allies. It has agreed to host the radar component of a proposed NATO nuclear missile defence shield, a project that is aimed mainly at Iran, with which Turkey has a tricky relationship. And Turkey has turned against Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria”(

Alte comentarii aparute ulterior acestui “varf” al crizei de peste weekend, care reliefeaza potentialul unei noi ecuatii geopolitice in Mideast, contureaza un veritabil unghi de abordare a insemnatatii in aceasta privinta a “primaverii arabe”. Gideon Rachman, editorialistul lui “Financial Times”, comenteaza pe blogul sau in felul urmator acest proaspat unghi de privire asupra evolutiilor recente din MENA: “The neocons were all for democratic revolutions across the Arab world – believing this to the be long-term route to political stability and prosperity. The Israelis were much more skeptical, fearing that democratic governments would take a much more populist (or maybe just popular) line on Israel – and endangering key regional relationships with Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.” (Gideon Rachman, “Israel, the Neocons and the Arab Spring”, September 12, 2011,


Relatiile dintre Israel si Turcia sau Egipt urmeaza sa fie clarificate, fiecare in parte, si nu sunt defel excluse viitoare derapaje. Dar, zilele de vineri si sambata, ca “varfuri“ ale crizei intervenite ofera posibilitatea trecerii in revista a unor opinii exprimate pe forumurile articolelor deja citate. Extrasele facute de noi tintesc deopotriva sa evidentieze ca in opinia publica a fost perceputa, la sfarsitul saptamanii trecute, o veritabila ruptura intre Israel si vecinii sai si ca sunt de asteptat noi astfel de modificari ale tabloului geopolitic regional asa cum era el perceput pana atunci. Astfel:


Relativ la relatia Turcia-Israel: 

1. “Actually it is Mr Erdogan of Turkey who is giving the naives doves of the Obama administration and the naive elites of Bruxelles bureaucracy the proof that there is not such a thing a ‘democratic islamist party‘. Mr Erdogan is bullying Cyprus and Israel of military attacks if those two countries do dare to defend their natural resources (the newfound gas fields between Cyprus and Israel). This Turkish islamist crisis is the real test of resolve for the weak European union. Is the EU able to stand military up to Turkey to defend the legitimate rights of an European union member like Cyprus against the military bullying of Turkey? Shall we see finally a true resolve in Europe to confront the ongoing provocation of the islamist government of Ankara?” (comentariu la articolul lui Gideon Rachman, “Israel, the Neocons and the Arab Spring”, September 12, 2011).

2. “/…/ Turkey, which after being rejected by the European Union, is eager to appear as the leader of its eastern neighboring region, is a tough nut to crack. It is huge (second largest military in NATO), prosperous, democratic. Israel and its Western allies cannot brush it aside as another terrorist or fundamentalist regime. And now that Turkey is going to actively support the Palestinians (with a democratizing Egypt trying to catch up to avoid the shame of Arab impotence) Israel is really stuck: they can't attack Turkey, they can't prevent Erdogan from visiting Gaza, and when Turkey starts providing Hamas/ West Bank with weapons what will Israel/ the West be able to do? Shriek shrilly? Well, the (weakened) US has been providing Israel with weapons, why can't Turkey do the same thing with Palestine, a UN-recognized state? Things are definitely not looking good for Israel. The end of impunity is coming to an end and the moment of reckoning closer. We used to say that with the Palestinians' bargaining hand getting weaker, they should probably have accepted the truncated state they were offered. We may well reach the point where Israel will feel sorry not to have accepted the Palestinians' conditions earlier, as it finds itself, for once and for a change, in a weak position.” (“The Economist”- comentariu la art.citat.)


3.In your comment, you accuse Israel of illegal settlements and ethnic cleansing. You then finished your comment by writing as follows: "Time to say enough is enough! Turkey is doing the right thing.I am curious as to why you are defending Turkey. From your comment it is obvious to you that Israel is guilty of many crimes. Nevertheless, Turkey does exactly the same things you accuse Israel of. For example, Turkey carried out an ethnic cleansing campaign of the Greek Cypriots in 1974. The Turks are currently illegally occupying northern Cyprus and about 40,000 Turks are living there as illegal settlers. In regard to the fighting with the Kurds, Turkey has always fought back harder, (i.e. disproportionate force) whenever they have been attacked by the PKK. This is the same thing that Israel does when attacked by its enemies.” (blogul G. Rachman- “Financial Times”).

4. ”Erdogan isn't concerned about human rights. He is motivated by politics and religion. Why else was he so quite during the brutal crackdown following the sham election in Iran? Why has his reaction towards Syria been so mild compared to his stance towards Israel? Why is he so friendly with the Sudanese regime who are accused of committing crimes against humanity? Why does he still refuse to recognize the Armenian genocide? Erdogan is like many other Muslims I have come across. He doesn't care that much about human rights violations if (a) the perpetrator are Muslims and the victims are non-Muslims and (b) the perpetrators are Muslims and the victims are Muslims. He only shows serious concern when (c) the perpetrator is a non-Muslim and the victim is a Muslim. There is a name for this: tribalism. (comentariu la blogul lui G. Rachman)


Relativ la relatia Israel-Egipt:

1. “The slogan that should alarm most outside the Israeli embassy in Cairo was the one that said "Down with the Military Council!" The Egyptian street more so than the Global Media's "readership" understands the depth of the bonds between Egypt's military leadership and Israel. They also understand that to date only the head of state has changed, while policies most material remain unchanged or even subject to harder lines and constraints.
The post-Tahrir civilian PM, Essam Sharaf, offered his resignation to the Military Council earlier today, but it was rejected. It appears he is staying on, but this should raise questions, as he has a record that would suggest genuine independence, despite experience and relationships formed in the US and Saudi Arabia. This latter side of his profile combined with what may appear as submission today could result in popular rejection of his continued leadership and amplified anger.” (comentariu blogul G. Rachman)

2. “The United States have kept the peace between Egypt and Israel, by giving $2 billion aid per year to Egypt, more like a bribe. Unfortunately, this peace is not between two peoples having common interests and values. It has always been a make belief one. May be it could have succeeded if President Sadat has lived longer. He paid it very dearly, with his life.“ (U.S. told Egypt it must rescue Israeli embassy workers or suffer 'consequences 'sources say' (

3. “Israel's inability to come to terms with the Palestinians and its increasing dependence on the US (illustrated most embarrassingly by the Egyptian embassy episode) is just as critical a failure. Netanjahu's coalition government has put Israel on the opposite trajectory of where it ought to have been heading. A peace agreement with the Palestinians now more than ever is a one of the only remaining avenues for preventing a huge security deterioration. Without one, Egyptian security can't sell maintaining peace along the border as self interest but as collusion in the oppression of the Palestinians, and won't be able to secure the border. Egypt reaps what it has sown, its schizophrenic policy towards Israel will be sorely put to the test and could be the undoing of the security apparatus still in place. Israel too ought to read the signs and understand it is becoming a crucial pivot in the Arab spring.“ (comentariu blogul lui G. Rachman);

4. “The civilized countries must tell Egyptian ruler that such behavior is unacceptable and there will be real consequences: Today, it's Israelis, tomorrow, it'll be the rest of the world.” (comentariu la

 “Flash”-ul intentionat de noi prin selectia atat a articolelor citate, cat si a unor comentarii este destinat sa fie utilizat la identificarea unui raspuns la o intrebare vitala din perspective securitatii internationale: incotro se indreapta azi Orientul Mijlociu?


 13 septembrie 2011.