Poland: US to deploy a Patriot missile battery at the Polish border with Russia
Simona SOARE
January 24, 2010
The development of Russian-American relations – in the “reset” age, that is – does not seem to go very well considering the latest announcements made by Polish authorities on January 21, 2009 and later confirmed by American sources: the United States are to deploy a Patriot missile battery in Poland. The battery will be deployed approximately 100km away from the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, to the town of Morag (Reuters, January 21, 2010). The announcement made by Polish president Lech Kaczynski presented the plan to deploy US Patriot missiles in Poland starting “this year” as a part of the agreed US missile defense system in Eastern Europe meant to offer protection against mid-range missiles incoming from Iran.
However, this move seems to be more of an offset of the plan, rather than the plan itself. The 2009 Obama reshuffle of the initial Bush plan did not feature any land-based missile deployments for the first phase of the implementation of the “proven, cost-effective, and adaptable” new plan (Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy. A "Phased, Adaptive Approach" for Missile Defense in Europe, White House, September 17, 2009). Moreover, during his tour of Eastern Europe, Vice-president Joe Biden addressed Polish concerns regarding the strength of US security guarantees to its Eastern European (particularly Polish) allies by arguing: “This strategic assurance is absolute, absolute […] a solemn obligation. […] Make no mistake about it: Our commitment to Poland [and the entire region] is unwavering” and inviolable. (Mending Fences, Biden Assures Poland That U.S. Is Watching Over It, NYT, October 21, 2009). However, never once did he mention the possibility of deploying missiles in Poland as part of the new Obama European missile defense plan’s first phase. The Obama administration focused only on sea-based elements of the shield, although in its declaration the White House mentioned these would be included in the first phase of the operationalisation - besides the land ones.
Simona SOARE
January 24, 2010
The development of Russian-American relations – in the “reset” age, that is – does not seem to go very well considering the latest announcements made by Polish authorities on January 21, 2009 and later confirmed by American sources: the United States are to deploy a Patriot missile battery in Poland. The battery will be deployed approximately 100km away from the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, to the town of Morag (Reuters, January 21, 2010). The announcement made by Polish president Lech Kaczynski presented the plan to deploy US Patriot missiles in Poland starting “this year” as a part of the agreed US missile defense system in Eastern Europe meant to offer protection against mid-range missiles incoming from Iran.
However, this move seems to be more of an offset of the plan, rather than the plan itself. The 2009 Obama reshuffle of the initial Bush plan did not feature any land-based missile deployments for the first phase of the implementation of the “proven, cost-effective, and adaptable” new plan (Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy. A "Phased, Adaptive Approach" for Missile Defense in Europe, White House, September 17, 2009). Moreover, during his tour of Eastern Europe, Vice-president Joe Biden addressed Polish concerns regarding the strength of US security guarantees to its Eastern European (particularly Polish) allies by arguing: “This strategic assurance is absolute, absolute […] a solemn obligation. […] Make no mistake about it: Our commitment to Poland [and the entire region] is unwavering” and inviolable. (Mending Fences, Biden Assures Poland That U.S. Is Watching Over It, NYT, October 21, 2009). However, never once did he mention the possibility of deploying missiles in Poland as part of the new Obama European missile defense plan’s first phase. The Obama administration focused only on sea-based elements of the shield, although in its declaration the White House mentioned these would be included in the first phase of the operationalisation - besides the land ones.
As it turns out though, Biden did have talks with the Polish allies regarding this possibility at the time of his visit considering that the two countries signed an agreement in November 2009 paving the way for the deployment of a US Patriot missile battery in Poland. In his brief statement, Polish president Kaczynski mentioned the fact that the deployment of US missiles on Polish territory strengthens the American security guarantee – particularly because the presence of US military personnel on Polish soil makes Washington that much more likely to intervene to solve/stop/defeat a crisis or a threat (presumably a Russian one) to Poland’s security. Also, the Polish president mentioned the fact that the new Obama missile defense plan for Europe is so much more appropriate for the current security environment in this region and will most likely prove more effective than the older Bush version of it.
Strangely enough, the new announcement regarding the deployment of land-based ABM elements in Poland marks a partial comeback to the older Bush version of the plan – albeit the location of deployed equipment is different. Under the Bush plan, the interceptors were supposed to be deployed at the outskirts of Warsaw, whereas in November 2009 a new location, in the Northern town of Morag, was negotiated. Moreover, new locations, in other states in the region - such as Romania, also visited by Vicepresident Biden in November 2009 - might also be considered.
The decision to deploy the missile battery to Morag, Poland was poorly justified. Apparently, according to Polish authorities, strategic calculations had nothing to do with the decision, but infrastructure did. The Polish authorities claim the military base in Morag offers much better facilities for their US allies. To a certain degree, this is true given that a Patriot missile battery and its accompanying troops have to be hosted somewhere – though military facilities around Warsaw one would think allow such a change of plans. The new location should came as no surprise given the reshuffled nature of the missile shield (at least in its first phase), given past threats by Russia to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad and target Polish and Czech missile defense sites, etc. But it should make one wonder why a missile shield based on a re-evaluation of Iranian capabilities that stipulates Tehran only has access to mid-range missiles has components as far North as Morag? Moreover, it should make one wonder why a missile shield that aims to intercept and destroy incoming enemy missiles in their ascent phase is deployed so far North (from where it could play only a second-fiddle sort of a role at best). Rather, the deployment itself is a sign of the American political commitment to guaranteeing Polish security – and US ground-based forward military presence in Poland is in this respect an end in itself.
Under the November 2009 agreement, Washington is to deploy a Patriot missile battery to Morag. The Patriot missile system is the US’s main land-based ABM system and it is a highly mobile and flexible one. The system has four major operational functions: communications, command and control (C3), radar surveillance, missile guidance and deploys on a battalion echelon grouping together a headquarters battery (radar, communications, etc), a maintenance battery and 4-6 line batteries (which actually contain the interceptors and are up-and running in an exceptionally short time of approximately 1 hour). A line battery consists of approximately 70-90 troops grouped into 4 platoons: the Fire Control platoon, Launcher platoon and Headquarters/maintenance platoon. Washington currently deploys one such Patriot battalion in Germany. Hence, the Patriot missile battery deployed in Poland will most probably be a line battery and it will feature as a part of the German-based battalion.
Launching the deployment of the first phase of the missile shield, due to achieve Initial Operational Capability by 2011, is likely to spark renewed tensions with Russia which might decide to deploy the Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad after all. This would make for a good justification for deploying the Patriots to Morag. Still, why bother to deploy land-based elements when sea-based ones (SM-3 interceptors on Aegis platforms) will be deployed in the region (and according to a Jane’s Defense deployment map, there will be at least three Aegis ships with interceptors on board in the Baltic by 2011) and will be able to protect Poland and Europe against incoming enemy missiles? Moreover, Russia decided to cancel the deployment of the Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad in the face of Obama’s reshuffle of the European missile shield. As for the current announcement, Russia’s response has been much more tempered. Despite threats made by a representative of the Russian Navy under conditions of anonymity that Russia will consolidate its surface, air and submarine components of the Baltic Fleet as a response to the US-Polish decision, the Russian Government denied such allegations and argued the consolidation of the Baltic Fleet is a part of the State Armaments Program and was not caused by the Polish announcement: “All rearmament and modernization measures being conducted in the Russian fleets, including the Baltic Fleet, are scheduled in accordance with the state armaments program and are part of the drive for a new image of the Armed Forces” (RIA Novosti, January 21, 2010). While it is true that the Baltic Fleet has been seen as a priority in terms of endowment under the State Armaments Program for the last half a decade at least, it has been put of repeatedly due to delays in research, development and testing of the Russian military-industrial complex. The warning thus rings a bit hollow.
On the one hand, the decision to deploy Patriot missile to Morag fits perfectly into the picture of the great concerns the Polish have about the Russian threat (which beyond historical fears and hurts, is rather understandable – their claim of exceptionalism aside). It also fits well with the great efforts the Polish are making to balance the US forward military presence in Eastern Europe – which had a preponderant Central and Eastern dimension, but no Northern one. The Polish have been quite vociferous in the past regarding the US plans to establish permanent military bases in Romania and Bulgaria. Moreover, Biden,'s visit to Romania in November 2009 was not at all reassuring for Warsaw as it sought to keep the missile shield in Poland. During the latest two NATO Summits – particularly the April 2008 one in Bucharest – they have complained about security guarantees under article 5 and expressed their serious doubts about them. This growing Polish skepticism about the Alliance they so gleefully joined over a decade ago marked a series of debates within NATO concerning the strength of NATO indivisible security guarantees and principles. The US have been more than willing to reaffirm and strengthen their commitment to the security of Poland and the entire region in order to soothe Polish fears especially after the new Obama administration reshuffled the Bush missile defense plan. The move was seen as a step back – a US attempt to disengage – and a concession made to Russia in an age of “resetting” the Russian-American relations and it was harshly criticized by Warsaw. Of course, Washington’s decision to go beyond its proposed missile defense plan and deploy land-based elements of the shield in the first phase might be considered as an attempt to “better” handle the concerns the announcement of the reshuffle caused in Eastern Europe in particularly. But it is also a signal that Washington is rather sensitive to Polish lobby.
The Polish discontent is misrepresented as a purely three-way affair: American-Polish-Russian. Rather, this discontent so loudly shouted in the face of Washington and NATO officials concerns more the Polish strategic role within Central and Eastern Europe and the Alliance as a whole. And it is not aimed at gaining equal security guarantees, but rather special and privileged ones. The Polish discontent is not marked by necessity alone – caused by an insurmountable and immediate Russian threat – but rather by the perception of a great security opportunity, too. Poland would very much like to see its strategic importance become a cornerstone in NATO and American (forward) regional military presence and thus cut of south-eastern European states from the equation and from gaining a similar position. The suspicions regarding Biden's visit to Romania in the context of the changed Obama strategy concerning the missile shield have brought about a series of speculations about how Bucharest, too might be included in the plan. However, speculations concern more the sea-based dimension (an Aegis system deployed under Romanian flag in the Black Sea, thus bypassing Montreux). Indeed, it seems Poland thinks of its security more in these terms than in integrating as an equal member in NATO. Yet, if Warsaw is putting its hopes in the basket of using historical guilt trips to force Washington and the Alliance into putting it on a sort of pedestal at the Eastern boarder of the West, other regional states should claim equal guarantees as well. After all, the Polish are not the only border state facing the Russian threat!
Under the November 2009 agreement, Washington is to deploy a Patriot missile battery to Morag. The Patriot missile system is the US’s main land-based ABM system and it is a highly mobile and flexible one. The system has four major operational functions: communications, command and control (C3), radar surveillance, missile guidance and deploys on a battalion echelon grouping together a headquarters battery (radar, communications, etc), a maintenance battery and 4-6 line batteries (which actually contain the interceptors and are up-and running in an exceptionally short time of approximately 1 hour). A line battery consists of approximately 70-90 troops grouped into 4 platoons: the Fire Control platoon, Launcher platoon and Headquarters/maintenance platoon. Washington currently deploys one such Patriot battalion in Germany. Hence, the Patriot missile battery deployed in Poland will most probably be a line battery and it will feature as a part of the German-based battalion.
Launching the deployment of the first phase of the missile shield, due to achieve Initial Operational Capability by 2011, is likely to spark renewed tensions with Russia which might decide to deploy the Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad after all. This would make for a good justification for deploying the Patriots to Morag. Still, why bother to deploy land-based elements when sea-based ones (SM-3 interceptors on Aegis platforms) will be deployed in the region (and according to a Jane’s Defense deployment map, there will be at least three Aegis ships with interceptors on board in the Baltic by 2011) and will be able to protect Poland and Europe against incoming enemy missiles? Moreover, Russia decided to cancel the deployment of the Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad in the face of Obama’s reshuffle of the European missile shield. As for the current announcement, Russia’s response has been much more tempered. Despite threats made by a representative of the Russian Navy under conditions of anonymity that Russia will consolidate its surface, air and submarine components of the Baltic Fleet as a response to the US-Polish decision, the Russian Government denied such allegations and argued the consolidation of the Baltic Fleet is a part of the State Armaments Program and was not caused by the Polish announcement: “All rearmament and modernization measures being conducted in the Russian fleets, including the Baltic Fleet, are scheduled in accordance with the state armaments program and are part of the drive for a new image of the Armed Forces” (RIA Novosti, January 21, 2010). While it is true that the Baltic Fleet has been seen as a priority in terms of endowment under the State Armaments Program for the last half a decade at least, it has been put of repeatedly due to delays in research, development and testing of the Russian military-industrial complex. The warning thus rings a bit hollow.
On the one hand, the decision to deploy Patriot missile to Morag fits perfectly into the picture of the great concerns the Polish have about the Russian threat (which beyond historical fears and hurts, is rather understandable – their claim of exceptionalism aside). It also fits well with the great efforts the Polish are making to balance the US forward military presence in Eastern Europe – which had a preponderant Central and Eastern dimension, but no Northern one. The Polish have been quite vociferous in the past regarding the US plans to establish permanent military bases in Romania and Bulgaria. Moreover, Biden,'s visit to Romania in November 2009 was not at all reassuring for Warsaw as it sought to keep the missile shield in Poland. During the latest two NATO Summits – particularly the April 2008 one in Bucharest – they have complained about security guarantees under article 5 and expressed their serious doubts about them. This growing Polish skepticism about the Alliance they so gleefully joined over a decade ago marked a series of debates within NATO concerning the strength of NATO indivisible security guarantees and principles. The US have been more than willing to reaffirm and strengthen their commitment to the security of Poland and the entire region in order to soothe Polish fears especially after the new Obama administration reshuffled the Bush missile defense plan. The move was seen as a step back – a US attempt to disengage – and a concession made to Russia in an age of “resetting” the Russian-American relations and it was harshly criticized by Warsaw. Of course, Washington’s decision to go beyond its proposed missile defense plan and deploy land-based elements of the shield in the first phase might be considered as an attempt to “better” handle the concerns the announcement of the reshuffle caused in Eastern Europe in particularly. But it is also a signal that Washington is rather sensitive to Polish lobby.
The Polish discontent is misrepresented as a purely three-way affair: American-Polish-Russian. Rather, this discontent so loudly shouted in the face of Washington and NATO officials concerns more the Polish strategic role within Central and Eastern Europe and the Alliance as a whole. And it is not aimed at gaining equal security guarantees, but rather special and privileged ones. The Polish discontent is not marked by necessity alone – caused by an insurmountable and immediate Russian threat – but rather by the perception of a great security opportunity, too. Poland would very much like to see its strategic importance become a cornerstone in NATO and American (forward) regional military presence and thus cut of south-eastern European states from the equation and from gaining a similar position. The suspicions regarding Biden's visit to Romania in the context of the changed Obama strategy concerning the missile shield have brought about a series of speculations about how Bucharest, too might be included in the plan. However, speculations concern more the sea-based dimension (an Aegis system deployed under Romanian flag in the Black Sea, thus bypassing Montreux). Indeed, it seems Poland thinks of its security more in these terms than in integrating as an equal member in NATO. Yet, if Warsaw is putting its hopes in the basket of using historical guilt trips to force Washington and the Alliance into putting it on a sort of pedestal at the Eastern boarder of the West, other regional states should claim equal guarantees as well. After all, the Polish are not the only border state facing the Russian threat!
