The seemingly unending Itaqi March 7 elections and the aftermath of the aftermath
Silviu PETRE
May 5, 2010
Borrowing a metaphor from strategy a regular electing process should resemble more or less to a Blitzkrieg: a vocal, tumultuous but rather swiftly campaign which translates the electoral will into a new configuration of power. Far from that, the post March 7 elections Iraq seems to have found itself in a Sitzkrieg- an attrition undecided warfare waged with institutional and media weapons. After the almost unperceivable 91-89 [seats in Parliament] victory of Al Allawi's al Iraqiya over the incumbent PM Nouri al Maliki, the latter accused fraud and demanded a recount of the votes.
The final result was as follows*:
-Iraqi National Movement (al-Iraqiya) : 2,631,388 /25.87%
-State of Law Coalition: 2,620,042 /25.76%
-National Iraqi Alliance: 1,976,412 /19.43%
-Kurdistan List: 1,553,667 /15.27%
-Movement for Change (Gorran): 443,871 /4.36%
-Unity Alliance of Iraq: 295,226/ 2.90%
-Iraqi Accord Front (al-Tawafuq): 276,733/ 2.72%
-Kurdistan Islamic Union: 230,742/ 2.27%
-Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 143,790/ 1.41%
-Minorities: 61,153/ -
On April 19, the Central Electoral Comission granted al Maliki's desire by starting a intricate and not to say a controversial process of recounting more than 2,5 million ballots. For Allawi and other critics of the incumbent PM, the recount is an institutional tool for changing the results in favor of al Maliki's coalition Law and Order and his Dawa Party.
Al Maliki, a Shiite can claim the support of moderate and laic Shiias but has almost no support outside his religious base being perceived as an abusive authoritarian leader who, during the last years used his power banished the Sunni population as a form of revenge for the Saddam years when Sunnis generated the leading class. Al Allawi, also a Shiite has managed to have is voice echoed and gain backing outside his religious base.
Two other major pawns crucial for both medium and long term stability as for the new searched power configuration are the Kurds and the clerics, most vocal being Muqtadah al Sadr. Sadr, a 36 year old theologian and political outspoken and militant has gained his reputation as the heir of a murdered father (also a theologian) and uncle and for his loud anti-American views. Although not yet a qualified interpreter of the Koran, the wannabe Ayatollah (according to some voices) has urged the Iraqi people to go to the vote and elect those candidates that favor a strong national independence policy along with the ousting of the American forces. But apart from his speech, the most powerful weapon of Sadr is his Jaysh al Mahdi militia men which may once again be unleashed on the street to create mayhem.
As part of the National Iraqi Alliance the Saadrist won 39 seats (40- according to other sources) in the Parliament.
Bound by their commitment to retreat their troops by September 1st 2010 from Iraq, the Americans face the challenge of assuring at least a façade stability blanket over the young and feeble multi-party republic while at the same not directly interfering in Baghdad's domestic issues. Through different channels, the Obama administration tried to come up with a plan for negotiations. One of the possible scenarios is the halving of the regular PM four year term in two year terms, one for al Maliki, the other for al Allawi, said Mohammed Othman, a veteran member of parliament.
However, the landscape of the post March7 elections moment was filled with a series of terrorist attacks, the first post-electoral event of this kind was on March 7 (38 dead in Baghdad) and the latest at the end of April. The response of the American and Iraqi forces finalized in killing two prominent Al Quaida members: one was the Egyptian Abu Ayyul Masri and the other one Abu Omar al Baghdadi. While some consider this a victory for al Maliki who based his rethorics on his key position as strong anti- insurgent leader, drawing a victory for he Iraqi government and US&Co. seems hasty. The country is far from pacified and the consensus from al the social, religious and tribal groups becomes a must that has to be fulfilled by each person to govern Iraq. The variations of some many factions does not help very much the formulation of public policies acceptable by everyone.
If we make on step back from the brute data, the Iraqi immature political environment can be explained by a series of laws and principles of political sciences.
First of all, using Almond and Verba terminology Iraq is a mix participatory-dependent civic culture (Almond& Verba, 1966). In other words Iraq is half way between a modern Western style industrialized democracy and a still tribal country based on blood loyalties. In such cases instability can be an undeniable presence and the temptation for populist authoritarian is pretty big.
Second, if we take the number of political parties as a measure one can see a plethora of political formations resembling more or less to the 1920s and ‘30s Weimar Republick. According to Giovanni Sartori the limit of stability is given by the existence of 5 up to 6 parliamentary parties. Above this number a greater number of important political parties in the parliament may hamper the formations of coalitions and mine the governing act itself.
Until the Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC) won't release the results of recounting, the succession to power isn't going to happen thus crippling the political routine into stalemate. Anyway a victory of al Maliki would be consider rigged and curtail an uprising of many Sunnis unsatisfied by the present chief of government.
