Silviu PETRE
February 22, 2010
As the Afghanistan dossier is moving towards a decade, the word stalemate used to describe it tends to become a sort of cliché. Outflanked by the Obama October initiative of supplementing the troops under the US and international flags and the February 2010 Marjah ground offensive, the London 28 January Conference marks an episode in the Afghanistan greater commitment blueprint series. Held by the British part which played the main role, the Conference involved mainly UN, Pakistan, India and the Afghan Government, although delegates from 60 countries were hosted. Following the suggestions of President Karzai, the delegates used the momentum for reflecting on a new pragmatic approach to the Taliban.
Two main directions were discussed:
1) The Afghanisation of the theatre by gradual security burden sharing from the ISAF and US forces to the Afghan Army and Police which will increase their strength up to 300.000 men and
2) Initiating a dialogue with the moderate Taliban leaders and foot soldiers in order to placing them on the Government payroll. The new approach, President Karzai’s brainchild seemed for many a 180° tournament from the initial US “we do not negotiate to the terrorists” speech in the early ‘00s. Already US pledged 141 million dollars to a special reintegration (or bribing) fond.
Less than a new clear pathway, the diplomatic talks highlighted a tiresome Western Alliance mirroring an Af-Pak desire for a less than ethical, but stability-prone policy. From the British point of view, the approaching general elections require an acceptable roadmap to be presented for a growing unpopular conflict in front of the electorate.
For the rather weak and illegitimate Government of Hamid Karzai, for many a Western puppet a possible compromise with the Taliban seems to b at this point the less evil solution. Far from being appalled one must consider that the present Kabul authorities have a maculate past- many of the actual political elite have a human rights breaching past, were former anti-Soviet mujahidins or knew a career marred by fraud. Even the President’ brother: Mohamed Wallid Karzai was indicted for drug traffic. According to Mallalai Joya, one of the female outspoken members of the Loya Jirga- the Afghan Parliament, 60% of the actual members are still connected to warlordism and outfit and some of them are even illiterate.
From the Pakistan point of view, a compromise would crown the Islamabad duplicity policy in the war against terrorism of official supporting US- Western efforts while tolerating the Taliban dwellings in Waziristan. The interest of Islamabad in Afghanistan aim an anti-Indian gambit: while India desires a moderate Islamic Kabul, Islamabad wants a more fundamentalist one. Beside that, Pakistan affirmed that a multilateral strategy should only contain Islamic countries bordering Afghanistan, thus excluding major Asian players such as India, Iran or The Russian Federation.
Surprisingly, India stood with the Pakistan line of upholding compromise, thus acting against its long term national interest in the region, according to a plethora of critics.
However, the 28th January 2010 London Conference didn’t discuss the Al-Qaeda issue focusing on a less painful agenda.
Outside the Conference walls, the talks were view with an at least skeptical eye. For many Afghani London based refugees the paces talks are morally unacceptable and a clear setback from a long lasting commitment that would offer a perpetual craved peace.
From the Taliban view, expressed even before the Conference on different sites o through different voices, the Conferences could only have a bogus role while achieving nothing. Contrasting to the low profile dialogue initiated prior to 28 of January by UN delegate Kay Eide labeled as hopeful, the Taliban communiqué dismisses the possibility of bribing a force whose motivations are beyond financial incentives.
