The Conundrums of AfPAK
Radu-Alexandru CUCUTA
March 24th, 2010
Ayesha R. Khan’s recent Chattham House paper, “The Pitfalls of AfPak” deals with the problems the new American strategy for the region need to take into account. Khan identifies 3 main difficulties the new strategy deals with in an incomplete manner. First, the increase in troops is likely to fuel the resentment many of the local inhabitants exhibit towards the foreign forces. This argument, however, must be considered only against the proclivities of the conflict the US is trying to end. The open or indirect hostility directed towards the American or the international forces is a trademark of the insurgency or guerilla conflicts and not a particular element manifest only in the case of the Afghan conflict. Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that the American strategy ignored the short-term adverse effects of the increase in effectives.
Secondly, Khan points out to another potential flaw in the American strategy. The present administration is trying to answer to two very different and to a certain point incompatible problems. On the one hand, it is the official goal of the Obama administration to end overseas deployments by 2011 (or at least during the president’s first term). On the other hand, although it is of utmost importance that both Pakistan and Afghanistan assert their authority over the volatile Pashtun region, given the difficulties Kabul has faced in building an efficient army and police force, the time-line set by the US may not be credible (and may lead in turn either to the building of an army in sorely need of additional manpower or to a political instrument that may show severe institutional weakness – an ethnic based instrument that may serve only as a volatile factor and not as a nation-building or peace-enforcement institution). Complementing the army by forming local militias may serve only as a short run expedient, as the long term perspectives seem to remain the same (the weakness of the central government, dependent on foreign assistance and support, incapable of developing powerful institutions).
Thirdly, Khan argues that the idea itself of a strategy that encompasses essentially internal problems of Afghanistan and Pakistan is counterproductive. On the one hand, acting against insurgency in the “Pashtun Belt” may lead, according to Khan, to a rise of “Pashtun nationalism”, given the fact that actions both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan are directed towards the tribal-inhabited area. On the other hand, control over the region has been at the core of historical conflicts between the two countries, the actions of the American forces thus being a possible catalyst of tensions between the two governments forced to work together over a very senzitive and dividing issue. In addition to that, there is also the problem of foreign aid, a matter not addressed by the American strategy. The Pashtun-inhabited areas harbor the world’s largest refugee population, the scant infrastructure affected by the military operations being a factor in one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises.
The solutions offered by Khan try to tackle the problems identified in the study. The break-down of local government as a consequence o the American/Pakistani intervention needs to be followed by the development of a new form of legitimate and effective local goovernment, a process that requires not only the strong resolve of the two states, but also a considerable ammount of foreign aid directed at medium and long-term political projects, capable of effectively and effieciently transforming the area targetted by the American strategy.
Nonetheless, there are several aspects Khan does not take into consideration. In spite of important differences between Afghanistan and Iraq, the American establishment has gained a first-hand experience of dealing with insurgencies and developping reconstruction programs. The situation in the field may be different in many regards, but the problems of efficient state-building amongst an ethnically-divided landscape are esentially the same. Furthermore, the question of FATA musn’t be understood in terms of a large-scale political and institutional experiment that needs to develop one of the most efficient and adapted forms of local and political government – asserting the Pakistani’s government’s authority in simple weberian terms may prove to be the easiest way out of a truly difficult political situation
Radu-Alexandru CUCUTA
March 24th, 2010
Ayesha R. Khan’s recent Chattham House paper, “The Pitfalls of AfPak” deals with the problems the new American strategy for the region need to take into account. Khan identifies 3 main difficulties the new strategy deals with in an incomplete manner. First, the increase in troops is likely to fuel the resentment many of the local inhabitants exhibit towards the foreign forces. This argument, however, must be considered only against the proclivities of the conflict the US is trying to end. The open or indirect hostility directed towards the American or the international forces is a trademark of the insurgency or guerilla conflicts and not a particular element manifest only in the case of the Afghan conflict. Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that the American strategy ignored the short-term adverse effects of the increase in effectives.
Secondly, Khan points out to another potential flaw in the American strategy. The present administration is trying to answer to two very different and to a certain point incompatible problems. On the one hand, it is the official goal of the Obama administration to end overseas deployments by 2011 (or at least during the president’s first term). On the other hand, although it is of utmost importance that both Pakistan and Afghanistan assert their authority over the volatile Pashtun region, given the difficulties Kabul has faced in building an efficient army and police force, the time-line set by the US may not be credible (and may lead in turn either to the building of an army in sorely need of additional manpower or to a political instrument that may show severe institutional weakness – an ethnic based instrument that may serve only as a volatile factor and not as a nation-building or peace-enforcement institution). Complementing the army by forming local militias may serve only as a short run expedient, as the long term perspectives seem to remain the same (the weakness of the central government, dependent on foreign assistance and support, incapable of developing powerful institutions).
Thirdly, Khan argues that the idea itself of a strategy that encompasses essentially internal problems of Afghanistan and Pakistan is counterproductive. On the one hand, acting against insurgency in the “Pashtun Belt” may lead, according to Khan, to a rise of “Pashtun nationalism”, given the fact that actions both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan are directed towards the tribal-inhabited area. On the other hand, control over the region has been at the core of historical conflicts between the two countries, the actions of the American forces thus being a possible catalyst of tensions between the two governments forced to work together over a very senzitive and dividing issue. In addition to that, there is also the problem of foreign aid, a matter not addressed by the American strategy. The Pashtun-inhabited areas harbor the world’s largest refugee population, the scant infrastructure affected by the military operations being a factor in one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises.
The solutions offered by Khan try to tackle the problems identified in the study. The break-down of local government as a consequence o the American/Pakistani intervention needs to be followed by the development of a new form of legitimate and effective local goovernment, a process that requires not only the strong resolve of the two states, but also a considerable ammount of foreign aid directed at medium and long-term political projects, capable of effectively and effieciently transforming the area targetted by the American strategy.
Nonetheless, there are several aspects Khan does not take into consideration. In spite of important differences between Afghanistan and Iraq, the American establishment has gained a first-hand experience of dealing with insurgencies and developping reconstruction programs. The situation in the field may be different in many regards, but the problems of efficient state-building amongst an ethnically-divided landscape are esentially the same. Furthermore, the question of FATA musn’t be understood in terms of a large-scale political and institutional experiment that needs to develop one of the most efficient and adapted forms of local and political government – asserting the Pakistani’s government’s authority in simple weberian terms may prove to be the easiest way out of a truly difficult political situation
