What does resetting the relations with Russia mean – a British Perspective?Radu-Alexandru CUCUTA
31mai 2009
A recent publication of Chatham House – Dealing with Russia: The Reset Button by Andrew Wood tries to analyze the perspectives on the US’ intentions of rebuilding its relations with Russia. The study takes a deeper look at the predictable shift in policy outgoing in Washington and focuses on three key aspects: the role of the European countries, Russia’s attitude towards the former Soviet states and the transformations manifest in Russian politics and the Russian society. Although the paper recognizes both the opportunity and the need for change in Russian-American relations, it is skeptical as to the possibility of a major breakthrough in bilateral relations between the two countries.
The reason the “reset” formula is criticized by the paper is twofold. On the one hand, although the past administration’s moves have sparked deep and extensive criticism, observers can only guess what the Obama administration intends to do. Resetting relations may be a symbolically powerful formula, but doing exactly the opposite of what president Bush did may be neither a solution nor a politically sound strategy. On the other hand, the paper acknowledges the fact that Russia and the US have a past behind them. Not counting the almost 20 years that have passed since the break of the Soviet Union, the complex webbing of interactions between the two countries sets the background of the future relations, in spite of what present political leaders may think or may hope for.
The report acknowledges there are three different problems the new administration’s policy may have to take into account. First, there is the problem of the European countries the American policy seems to not take into account. The European countries may acquiesce to a toning down of the support for Ukraine and Georgia’s NATO membership bid (in return for a tighter institutional cooperation with these countries). The report underlines the paradox – at present, the states that are probably looking with interest at the American change in policy are at the same time the states that would back off in front of the Russian hostility for the move (the paper’s hypothesis is that although such a move would signal an intent for compromise, Russia is still intent on following an all or nothing strategy). We might add that negotiating an European move without formally acknowledging the role of the EU is at least strange for the moment.
Secondly, the report tries to look at the relations between Moscow and the former Soviet countries. While the fact that there is a legitimate set of Russian interests in the Kremlin’s “near abroad” space is the right move, the paper emphasizes the fact that this recognition shouldn’t mean that Russia should be allowed to impose its views on the former Soviet countries. The paper avoids using the concept of hegemony, but it underlines Russia’s dominating intentions.
Last but not least, the report warns about looking into the transformations of Russian politics and society. The paper emphasizes the fact that Russia rediscovered its imperial past and its firm tone in international relations is the combination of this cultural view, its yearn to have it’s Great Power status firmly recognized and the stress on the extraordinary nature of Russian destiny. There are some observations to be made here: on the one hand, the manifest Russian destiny is very reminiscent of Henry Kissinger’s past observations on Russian foreign policy. On the other hand, this mixture is hardly characteristic to Russia (it may be well extended to formal imperial powers dealing with the post-imperial international realities). At the same time, this set of ideas behind Russian policy hardly fit the scheme of a major transformation undergoing in Moscow. The reuse of a 19th century conceptual scheme and of realist concepts cannot explain the social and political transformations outgoing at the beginning of the 21st century.
The conclusion of the paper is that a major breakthrough in American-Russian relations is neither possible, nor desirable. Russia cannot be seen as a Eurasian geopolitical equal of the US. Nor does Russia have the power to influence the dynamics of regions Washington is most interested in. At the moment, the strategic partnership between the two countries is a diplomatic courtesy, as cooperation may seem distant. The step-by-step approach may seem a wiser choice as the issues on the table are numerous and a successful bargain implies also some changes in Russia’s policy (especially when it comes to former Soviet countries).
The report acknowledges there are three different problems the new administration’s policy may have to take into account. First, there is the problem of the European countries the American policy seems to not take into account. The European countries may acquiesce to a toning down of the support for Ukraine and Georgia’s NATO membership bid (in return for a tighter institutional cooperation with these countries). The report underlines the paradox – at present, the states that are probably looking with interest at the American change in policy are at the same time the states that would back off in front of the Russian hostility for the move (the paper’s hypothesis is that although such a move would signal an intent for compromise, Russia is still intent on following an all or nothing strategy). We might add that negotiating an European move without formally acknowledging the role of the EU is at least strange for the moment.
Secondly, the report tries to look at the relations between Moscow and the former Soviet countries. While the fact that there is a legitimate set of Russian interests in the Kremlin’s “near abroad” space is the right move, the paper emphasizes the fact that this recognition shouldn’t mean that Russia should be allowed to impose its views on the former Soviet countries. The paper avoids using the concept of hegemony, but it underlines Russia’s dominating intentions.
Last but not least, the report warns about looking into the transformations of Russian politics and society. The paper emphasizes the fact that Russia rediscovered its imperial past and its firm tone in international relations is the combination of this cultural view, its yearn to have it’s Great Power status firmly recognized and the stress on the extraordinary nature of Russian destiny. There are some observations to be made here: on the one hand, the manifest Russian destiny is very reminiscent of Henry Kissinger’s past observations on Russian foreign policy. On the other hand, this mixture is hardly characteristic to Russia (it may be well extended to formal imperial powers dealing with the post-imperial international realities). At the same time, this set of ideas behind Russian policy hardly fit the scheme of a major transformation undergoing in Moscow. The reuse of a 19th century conceptual scheme and of realist concepts cannot explain the social and political transformations outgoing at the beginning of the 21st century.
The conclusion of the paper is that a major breakthrough in American-Russian relations is neither possible, nor desirable. Russia cannot be seen as a Eurasian geopolitical equal of the US. Nor does Russia have the power to influence the dynamics of regions Washington is most interested in. At the moment, the strategic partnership between the two countries is a diplomatic courtesy, as cooperation may seem distant. The step-by-step approach may seem a wiser choice as the issues on the table are numerous and a successful bargain implies also some changes in Russia’s policy (especially when it comes to former Soviet countries).
