A historical visit
M. HARESHAN
November 23, 2009
If one has to search for a historical parallel – from the point of view of the long-term historical significance – to the three-day visit that US President Barack Obama paid to China last week then the only event of similar caliber would be the visit that his predecessor President Richard Nixon paid to China in February 1972. In other words, what happened last week in Beijing basically takes place only once in a generation. And here is why we propose this historical parallel:
1. In February 1972 Nixon visited Beijing after preparations that lasted several years and that included the use of a secret channel of communication offered by Nicolae Ceausescu, thus making a fundamental move on the Cold War stage. As a consequence of the visit, Communist China was recognized by the US and took her legitimate seat at the UN by replacing Taiwan, with the bipolar era basically becoming a triangular power play in which the Washington-Beijing duopoly placed the USSR in the minority and hastened the collapse of that empire.
In November 2009 in Beijing, Obama outlined that he does not want to contain China nor does he consider it a strategic competitor, instead considering it a privileged partner for solving global problems ranging from global warming to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and from managing the world economy to assuring the global balance of power. ‘We know that more is to be gained when great powers co-operate than when they collide,’ Obama said in a speech in China. ‘The United States welcomes China’s efforts in playing a greater role on the world stage – a role in which a growing economy is joined by growing responsibilities.’ Jon Huntsman, the US ambassador to China, was even more straightforward: ‘There are really only two countries in the world that can solve certain issues... So the meetings really have been aimed at coordinating like never before on the key global issues.’
2. The visit that Nixon and the Secretary of State Kissinger paid to China in February 1972 took place in a tense climate on the global Cold War arena. While the Conference for Security and Cooperation was being prepared in Europe, a conference that ended with the Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975 thus confirming the dividing of Europe between the two poles of the bipolar age, Moscow was embroiled in a muffled ideological and geopolitical conflict with China, a conflict whose increasingly frequent armed clashes at the border between the two giants threatened to turn it into a heated conflict.
Today the economic and financial global crisis takes place in a context that is just as tense. The imperative of building a new global economic order based on the facts imposed by globalization is absolutely obvious. Globalization has determined a growing interdependence at international level, one that calls for a global multi-polar construct, hence for abandoning the unipolarism recently promoted by the George W. Bush administration in its first mandate. In a recently published article, former Admiral and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Bill Owens wrote that: ‘The US-China relationship is a vital interest for the two countries and the world. Throughout history, great powers have tended to become adversaries. Now, for a few years, we have a chance to break that cycle. It will take strong and enduring commitment on both sides. But a new and engaging relationship is imperative for our common good.’
3. In 1972 the US-China relationship had to find an innovative approach to a bilateral file that was historically burdened by the irreconcilable ideological adversity and by its consequences in terms of regional, global and internal power (the US-Taiwan relationship for example). The historical reality showed it was possible. Today, despite the differences that might separate the two great powers, it is foreseeable that these differences too will be overcome. Pragmatism will impose that. First of all because, as stated increasingly frequently in Washington lately, ‘power is no longer a zero-sum game.’ Secondly, because in a generation’s time China’s GDP will equal the US GDP, hence the world will have two economic giants. Finally, from a military point of view China will at least equal the US at the current rhythm of military spending. And if we are to add that the two great powers are today inextricably linked from an economic point of view – America has a deficit of almost USD 300 bln in bilateral relations – we understand why Obama’s visit to China last week had to be loaded with pragmatism.
The American opinions regarding the visit are diverse. However even the criticism levied – such as the fact that Obama was blamed for giving up on the traditional references to human rights issues – point to a change that Obama brought to his predecessors’ usual attitude. It is also true that in China there seem to be debates on assuming a more pronounced global posture too although the joint American-Chinese communiqué that followed Obama’s visit carefully avoids making any reference to a possible G-2. A comment made by China’s Xinhua agency is illustrative for the way in which Obama’s visit was perceived in Beijing: ‘The West’s perception of China has been changing gradually, and a positive turn has occurred as Obama has said more than once during his ongoing Asia tour that the United States would not seek to contain China’s rise but welcome China as a strong and prosperous player in the community of nations.’
Hence, apart from any speculations regarding the creation of a new global order based on an American-Chinese duopoly and despite the many criticisms expressed by the American press, we believe Obama’s visit to Beijing leaves behind the perception that this event is addressed to history’s ‘long term.’
