The Six or Five-Party Talks
Radu-Alexandru CUCUTA
June 22, 2009
North Korea’s recent nuclear tests have proven to be another big blow to the Six-Party Talks format that was supposed to alleviate the problems posed by North Korea’s intentions of developing a nuclear weapons arsenal. In spite of international opposition and the increasing pressure from its neighbors, North Korea’s recent test seemed to show the resolve of Pyongyang and the incapacity of the present format of diplomatic interaction to prevent the communist regime of accomplishing its goals. The six-party talks were interrupted at the end of September 2007 and in spite of several attempts to initiate another round of negotiation, no positive result has been achieved insofar. (Xinhua, BBC News, CSIS, CNN)
Radu-Alexandru CUCUTA
June 22, 2009
North Korea’s recent nuclear tests have proven to be another big blow to the Six-Party Talks format that was supposed to alleviate the problems posed by North Korea’s intentions of developing a nuclear weapons arsenal. In spite of international opposition and the increasing pressure from its neighbors, North Korea’s recent test seemed to show the resolve of Pyongyang and the incapacity of the present format of diplomatic interaction to prevent the communist regime of accomplishing its goals. The six-party talks were interrupted at the end of September 2007 and in spite of several attempts to initiate another round of negotiation, no positive result has been achieved insofar. (Xinhua, BBC News, CSIS, CNN)
There are several arguments to be made about the present format of negotiating the North-Korean crisis. On the one hand, observers can argue that the six parties pursue different goals and different objectives, but the fact is that the interests of the five countries opposing nuclear proliferation are complementary and all derive from the common goal of dismantling the DPRK’s nuclear project. On the other hand, the means of solving the Korean problem are more relevant in themselves than the problem of nuclear proliferation – the six-party format is the test for the new multilateral approach to world politics whose rise many observers have talked about the last years.
The US has both a global and a regional approach to its approach. First of all, its commitments to the defense of ROK and Japan are obligations Washington must honor. Secondly, the US is directly interested in ensuring non-proliferation. The risk posed by the Korean arsenal is augmented by the speculations as to the regime’s stability and its immediate future (the speculations over Kim Jong-Il’s health and the “succession” of an unknown yet heir-presumptive can only fuel the fears of the US). The risks of conventional escalation, along with the stance on human rights are another element that is factored into the American decisional process. The observer must also acknowledge that this perspective, alongside the importance of a multilateral approach to the matter, is shared by both Russia and China, both eager to prove that there is a new way of dealing with crisis in the emerging multipolar world. Each of the three major powers has a direct stake in the success of the negotiations.
China and ROK are directly interested in preventing a predictable massive influx of refugees that may occur in case the communist regime topples. At the same time, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Pyongyang poses a major security threat to Seul (a similar situation is encountered by Japan), whereas China finds itself reluctantly tied to an unruly ally that defies advice but keeps asking for economic aid and support. From Pyongyang’s perspective, the nuclear program serves also as a propaganda factor for the regime, but its main goal has always been to ensure a generous trade-off. In exchange for the foreclosure of the nuclear program, the communist regime expects a relaxation on foreign aid, the completion of two light-water reactors; it’s elimination from the US’ terrorism-sponsoring states alongside a credible security guarantee from Washington (that has maintained a powerful force in the Peninsula for the last 50 years).
Looking at the actor’s objectives, the first conclusion that comes to mind is that the recent reaction to the North Korean move – UN’s 1874 Resolution - is the harshest measure taken against the communist regime in Pyongyang. The DPRK is prohibited the import of weapons (except for small arms, and only after an approval of the UNSC), all cargo heading to North Korea is to be inspected and all materials usable in the nuclear process are to be destroyed, the resolution concludes by asking the communist regime to participate in the six-party negotiations.
The main challenge to the process is that in spite of Chinese or Russian rhetoric, US is expected to lead the way. The Obama administration has a political commitment to search for alternative ways of dealing with the crisis (the bilateral approach of separate US-DPRK meetings used in 2007 and 2006 seemed to undermine the whole purpose of the multilateral framework without ensuring positive results). At the same time, the concerns of Japan and ROK are enhanced by the seemingly unpredictable behavior of the DPRK. The surprise comes from both China and Russia. Russia’s participation and influence over the talks was limited. The main stake for the Kremlin in the process, alongside ensuring non-proliferation is rather a matter of prestige. Russia has to prove it is a world player and it has to ensure alternative approaches and institutions are a part of the multipolar world its leaders envisage. Therefore, the level of commitment on the Russian side is prone to fluctuations (as the only objectives are somewhat distant from the problem at hand). China, on the other hand, is also determined to make the regional multilateral approach work. Therefore, the harsh tone of the Chinese Government expresses its dissatisfaction with the Korean move. The paradox is that whereas the US is interested in solving the crisis, both China and Russia are interested in the success of the new negotiation format (that intrinsically depends on curbing North Korea’s expectations and international actions). The obvious problem is that the multipolar framework is waiting the unipolar approval of Washington.
The US has both a global and a regional approach to its approach. First of all, its commitments to the defense of ROK and Japan are obligations Washington must honor. Secondly, the US is directly interested in ensuring non-proliferation. The risk posed by the Korean arsenal is augmented by the speculations as to the regime’s stability and its immediate future (the speculations over Kim Jong-Il’s health and the “succession” of an unknown yet heir-presumptive can only fuel the fears of the US). The risks of conventional escalation, along with the stance on human rights are another element that is factored into the American decisional process. The observer must also acknowledge that this perspective, alongside the importance of a multilateral approach to the matter, is shared by both Russia and China, both eager to prove that there is a new way of dealing with crisis in the emerging multipolar world. Each of the three major powers has a direct stake in the success of the negotiations.
China and ROK are directly interested in preventing a predictable massive influx of refugees that may occur in case the communist regime topples. At the same time, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Pyongyang poses a major security threat to Seul (a similar situation is encountered by Japan), whereas China finds itself reluctantly tied to an unruly ally that defies advice but keeps asking for economic aid and support. From Pyongyang’s perspective, the nuclear program serves also as a propaganda factor for the regime, but its main goal has always been to ensure a generous trade-off. In exchange for the foreclosure of the nuclear program, the communist regime expects a relaxation on foreign aid, the completion of two light-water reactors; it’s elimination from the US’ terrorism-sponsoring states alongside a credible security guarantee from Washington (that has maintained a powerful force in the Peninsula for the last 50 years).
Looking at the actor’s objectives, the first conclusion that comes to mind is that the recent reaction to the North Korean move – UN’s 1874 Resolution - is the harshest measure taken against the communist regime in Pyongyang. The DPRK is prohibited the import of weapons (except for small arms, and only after an approval of the UNSC), all cargo heading to North Korea is to be inspected and all materials usable in the nuclear process are to be destroyed, the resolution concludes by asking the communist regime to participate in the six-party negotiations.
The main challenge to the process is that in spite of Chinese or Russian rhetoric, US is expected to lead the way. The Obama administration has a political commitment to search for alternative ways of dealing with the crisis (the bilateral approach of separate US-DPRK meetings used in 2007 and 2006 seemed to undermine the whole purpose of the multilateral framework without ensuring positive results). At the same time, the concerns of Japan and ROK are enhanced by the seemingly unpredictable behavior of the DPRK. The surprise comes from both China and Russia. Russia’s participation and influence over the talks was limited. The main stake for the Kremlin in the process, alongside ensuring non-proliferation is rather a matter of prestige. Russia has to prove it is a world player and it has to ensure alternative approaches and institutions are a part of the multipolar world its leaders envisage. Therefore, the level of commitment on the Russian side is prone to fluctuations (as the only objectives are somewhat distant from the problem at hand). China, on the other hand, is also determined to make the regional multilateral approach work. Therefore, the harsh tone of the Chinese Government expresses its dissatisfaction with the Korean move. The paradox is that whereas the US is interested in solving the crisis, both China and Russia are interested in the success of the new negotiation format (that intrinsically depends on curbing North Korea’s expectations and international actions). The obvious problem is that the multipolar framework is waiting the unipolar approval of Washington.
