No problems with neighbours
M. HARESHAN
May 15, 2010
These years, new accents have appeared in Turkey's
foreign policy. If before this turning point - which can be linked to the name
of A. Davutoglu, foreign minister since 2007 - Turkey has displayed a remarkable
linearity in its foreign policy, moving towards the West in its position of
both NATO member and EU accession candidate, after this moment it adopted what
is called an "all-azimuth policy." This is based on a contemporary
interpretation of its own national traditions and tries to put to the best use Turkey's very important geostrategic position,
at the crossroads between civilisations, and the strategic directions between
Europe and Asia. Three regions are
particularly interesting for Turkey,
in this "tous azimouts" policy - the Caucasus and the Black Sea, the Balkans
and the enlarged Middle East.
A main guideline of this new policy referred to regulating relations with
neighbors, so that the friendly neighborhood facilitates substantial economic
growth.
Actually, Turkey
experiences a remarkable economic growth, against the background of a
demographic boom, and keeping the current trends requires very predictable and
stable foreign relations. While Turkey
relies upon this stability for its own development, it needs it even more
because some of the planet's most tense areas are in its close vicinity. Thus,
proximity to the Middle East makes Turkey
sensitive to evolutions in Iran
and Iraq,
and to the whole array of issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The same,
the Caucasus and the Black Sea are also
challenges, given the Azeri-Armenian conflict in Nagorno Karabakh, among
others.
On the European front, the problem of Northern Cyprus and of a complex relation
with Greece in the Aegean
Sea are the most prominent topics of interest for Ankara.
Given the new political line adopted by Ankara,
the two-day visit paid by Turkish Premier Recep Tayyp Erdogan to Greece - the
first after 2004 - comes as no surprise. The severe economic crisis experienced
by Greece - which avoided defaulting only due to the firm intervention of EU
states, which provided an astronomic loan of US 140 bln - is a first vector of
this international context. Besides the fact that this loan comes at the cost
of harsh austerity measures regarding domestic consumption (some experts even
say it will take Greece a decade to return to its GDP of 2008), there is the
reality of military expenses made by both countries now, at a moment when
Athens is forced to operate severe cuts in its budget. During the last decades,
Turkey and Greece were on the brink of war at least twice,
in 1974 and 1996, and the issues of Cyprus
and of the Turkish air traffic above the Aegean
are still causing tension in bilateral relations. In this situation, if any of
the sides acquired military superiority due to a higher defence budget, this
would suddenly increase the risk of conflict.
Turkish Premier Erdogan characterised his visit to Greece as "historic." Indeed, for
the first time, the cabinets of the two states met in a joint session (Erdogan
was accompanied by 10 ministers), and the agreements signed on this occasion
are meant to give a new momentum to bilateral relations. In a joint statement
delivered on May 14, the two sides presented the agreements as "a big step
forward" that will lead to the "strengthening of peace and stability in the
region." The agreements refer to many activity sectors: tourism, transport,
energy, education, environment, fighting illegal migration. About 100 Turkish
businessmen accompanied Erdogan to Greece, as proof of the stronger
economic cooperation.
As far as curbing military expenses is concerned, it is clear that appeasing
the tension between the two states will be the priority trend, from now on.
This was also reflected by the two premiers' statements. Thus, Greek PM G.
Papandreou said: "We, with our many islands and the experience of Cyprus,
definitely have a fear... Could Turkey
at some point decide to take over a Greek island? Don't laugh, such a fear
exists, unfortunately. But maybe Turkey
is also afraid Greece
will attack." He urged Ankara
to provide flight plans for its military aircraft using the Aegean area, to
avoid their being intercepted by armed Greek fighters. In his turn, Erdogan
came with the vision of "the other side" to suggest the comprehensive
understanding that has been reached: "Both countries have very large defence
budgets... We must reduce these expenditures and use the money for other
purposes."
As Greece announced it will
lower its defence budget by a quarter, such an agreement is good news for
stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. We
might even say this allayed fears that Greece's problems might be an
invitation to higher tension in bilateral relations.
Both states seem to have entered a win-win game. On one hand, Turkey achieves one of its foreign policy
priorities at the Aegean, namely to have no problems with its neighbor, while Greece can thus
focus its energy on overcoming its severe problems of late. This is a telltale
example of the stimulating force of cooperative security promoted by NATO and
the EU in the Euro-Atlantic region.
Undoubtly, Erdogan's visit to Greece, approximately at the same time as that of the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Turkey, is telling about Ankara's dynamic moves in foreign policy. Endeavoring to consolidate its interests in the Black Sea and the Caucasus, as well as the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is pursuing a daring foreign policy agenda. They might soon create in the above-mentioned areas an environment with great potential to change some of the major trends (mainly in the Black Sea and the Caucasus areas) in which both NATO and the European Union are interested - or have initiated them altogether.