Russia wants up to 10 submarines in Black Sea Fleet
Horia Bărbulescu
Russia wants to launch up to 10 Lada-class submarines in the Black Sea. The ships will be based in the Russian port of Novorossiysk. The deputy head of the Russian Navy General Staff, Oleg Burtsev, declared that the action aims at upgrading the existing fleet. Ukraine is opposing this initiative considering it an attempt to augment the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea. The spokesman for Ukraine's Foreign Ministry, Vasily Kyrylych, said that even if this is about upgrading the fleet, it must be done only after the signing of appropriate agreements with Ukraine. The Russian Black Sea Fleet is stationed in Crimea, but the authorities in Kiev repeatedly emphasized that Ukraine would not extend the lease of the base in Sevastopol. (RIA Novosti, Xinhua, MosNews, Journal of Turkish Weekly)
Such declarations by Russian military representatives are not a novelty. Now they are circulated as the NATO summit (3-4 April, 2009) approaches and this context constitutes a powerful incentive for such an attitude. Further more, during these days the American frigate USS Klarkring is performing a tour of the Black Sea and the usual protests in Crimea have already taken place. Although it’s less likely that the new administration in Washington will pay too much attention to the Black Sea region, the visit of the American ship is also a routine meant to test Russia’s sensitivity.
If these declarations are the result of some clear intentions and they will materialize, then this will happen at earliest in 2015, the date announced for the finalization of new Lada-class submarines. Thus, we can analyze Russia’s attitude from the usual perspective of “maintaining the spheres of influence”. Russia is sending messages to the USA that the Black Sea is still in its “backyard” and it can bring “fresh forces” to protect it and the period before the NATO summit is the most appropriate for this aim.
The reactions of the Ukrainian authorities were stronger than at the beginning of March 2009, when the previous Russian declarations appeared. Russia intents to build its naval base in Novorossiysk and from this point of view Ukraine must play the card of the opposition to the increase of Russian forces in the Black Sea. The issue of this base is more acute than the eventual augmentation of Russian naval capabilities. If the Russian initiative will succeed, then Ukraine will lose an important leverage in its relation with Russia. In the end, this is one of the purposes of the Russian actions and declarations up to now: to show that Ukraine’s threats regarding the extension of the lease contract are not affecting Russia. On the other hand, the present government in Ukraine wants to show that NATO is still high on its agenda and that it can contest Russian declarations through positions representative for its security identity (still uncertain, we may cautiously). The approach of the NATO summit constitutes a good moment, for Russia and Ukraine, to exchange aggressive retorts.
Concerning the other major player in the region, Turkey, its reactions didn’t appear (and will probably not appear). The analysis of this passive attitude might suggest the idea of a Russian Turkish condominium in the region. How permanent and how appropriate this solution is for the security issues of the region remains to be seen. But until the concrete manifestation (not only rhetorical) of a strong commitment of the states in the Euro-Atlantic community towards the region, the tolerant position of Turkey towards these penetration attempts will remain the same.
In the case of NATO, its relation with the Black Sea region is multifaceted. The alliance’s priority right now is the managing of the situation in Afghanistan. NATO’s ambitions in the region are high, as we have seen in the last summit and in the following declarations which persisted in the idea of the eventual acceptance of Ukraine and Georgia as members of the alliance. The necessity of NATO’s involvement is evident through its members proximity to the Black Sea, but the perspectives are limited. In addition, Russia is willing to negotiate with the European members of NATO only on issues closer to the “soft security” side: energetic security, economic security, etc. Russia prefers to discuss the military security issues with the USA “from superpower to superpower”.
March 25, 2009
Such declarations by Russian military representatives are not a novelty. Now they are circulated as the NATO summit (3-4 April, 2009) approaches and this context constitutes a powerful incentive for such an attitude. Further more, during these days the American frigate USS Klarkring is performing a tour of the Black Sea and the usual protests in Crimea have already taken place. Although it’s less likely that the new administration in Washington will pay too much attention to the Black Sea region, the visit of the American ship is also a routine meant to test Russia’s sensitivity.
If these declarations are the result of some clear intentions and they will materialize, then this will happen at earliest in 2015, the date announced for the finalization of new Lada-class submarines. Thus, we can analyze Russia’s attitude from the usual perspective of “maintaining the spheres of influence”. Russia is sending messages to the USA that the Black Sea is still in its “backyard” and it can bring “fresh forces” to protect it and the period before the NATO summit is the most appropriate for this aim.
The reactions of the Ukrainian authorities were stronger than at the beginning of March 2009, when the previous Russian declarations appeared. Russia intents to build its naval base in Novorossiysk and from this point of view Ukraine must play the card of the opposition to the increase of Russian forces in the Black Sea. The issue of this base is more acute than the eventual augmentation of Russian naval capabilities. If the Russian initiative will succeed, then Ukraine will lose an important leverage in its relation with Russia. In the end, this is one of the purposes of the Russian actions and declarations up to now: to show that Ukraine’s threats regarding the extension of the lease contract are not affecting Russia. On the other hand, the present government in Ukraine wants to show that NATO is still high on its agenda and that it can contest Russian declarations through positions representative for its security identity (still uncertain, we may cautiously). The approach of the NATO summit constitutes a good moment, for Russia and Ukraine, to exchange aggressive retorts.
Concerning the other major player in the region, Turkey, its reactions didn’t appear (and will probably not appear). The analysis of this passive attitude might suggest the idea of a Russian Turkish condominium in the region. How permanent and how appropriate this solution is for the security issues of the region remains to be seen. But until the concrete manifestation (not only rhetorical) of a strong commitment of the states in the Euro-Atlantic community towards the region, the tolerant position of Turkey towards these penetration attempts will remain the same.
In the case of NATO, its relation with the Black Sea region is multifaceted. The alliance’s priority right now is the managing of the situation in Afghanistan. NATO’s ambitions in the region are high, as we have seen in the last summit and in the following declarations which persisted in the idea of the eventual acceptance of Ukraine and Georgia as members of the alliance. The necessity of NATO’s involvement is evident through its members proximity to the Black Sea, but the perspectives are limited. In addition, Russia is willing to negotiate with the European members of NATO only on issues closer to the “soft security” side: energetic security, economic security, etc. Russia prefers to discuss the military security issues with the USA “from superpower to superpower”.
March 25, 2009
