Another BRIC in the wall
Radu-Alexandru CUCUTA
June 22, 2009
Radu-Alexandru CUCUTA
June 22, 2009
This week Russia hosted in Yekaterinburg the first meeting of the BRIC summit. Although several meetings between the leaders of the four countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) have taken place before (usually during the UN conferences the four presidents attended or outside the regular schedule of the Shanghai Organization meetings), the event was heralded as the first step of an important institutional break in the relations of the four aforementioned countries, international observers comparing the proceedings of the meeting with the G8 or G20 summits. (RIA Novosti, Xinhua, CNN, BBC News, The Times)
There are several important aspects the meeting in Yekaterinburg brought forth. On the one hand, it is ironic to observe how a term coined by Jim O’Neill, a Goldman-Sachs analyst, and used mainly in Western papers was thoroughly was set down by the four countries. BRIC becomes an acronym that circumvents the “great power” or “emergent power” rhetoric the four countries have accustomed us with. Whether the change will reflect itself in actual international policies, institutions or cooperation is totally another thing.
The agenda of the meeting was rather symbolic. The four states reaffirmed their commitment to not recognizing the independence of Kosovo. The foreign ministries of the BRIC countries implied that major breakthroughs are to be achieved in relation to the Doha negotiation rounds and that Brazil and India are to play a more prominent role in the UN. The four countries consider that due to their economic importance they are entitled to a more comprehensive representation in the international financial institutions. At the same time, the governments reaffirmed their commitment to overcoming the challenge posed by the global food crisis, stressing their efforts on ensuring food security.
The reasons why the results of this first meeting are rather symbolic are numerous. On the one hand, international observers wouldn’t expect any of the four countries to change their point of view on the Kosovo issue. Facing similar challenges themselves, and after expressing their serious disappointment on the way the US and several European countries chose to end the problem, the BRIC countries were obliged to maintain their position. The most surprising aspect is the fact that they chose to talk about the issue at a time when the international agenda was dominated by several other important topics (the topic of the international economic crisis, for example, wasn’t directly approached; neither was global warming or the WHO’s warning of imminent outbreaks of swine flu).
On the other hand, the demand for positive conclusions in the Doha round negotiations or the stress on the recognition the BRIC countries are entitled to, both in terms of prestige and institutional influence within the UN or the World Bank are long time grievances of the aforementioned crisis. The prospects of a major shift in the organizational structure of the UN or the redrawing of the influential positions of the World Bank are subjects that have been debated before and although there is a greater susceptivity to these demands than in the past, no plan or negotiation has yet to take these into account.
The rhetoric of the first BRIC summit is a combination between the four countries’ fears and desires. In spite of the optimistic comments of President Medvedev, BRIC is not a major economic and political pole as long as the only backing of that argument is summing up trade statistics. Although the meeting was seen only as the first step, the four countries or the Shanghai Organization do not have the cohesion and the coherence of the European Union (an institution whose importance Russia has always tried to downplay, insisting on the bilateral aspect of its foreign relations).
The four countries are important partners, but their common interests are still very diverse (taking the WTO as an example, the increasingly important role played by Brazil or India is totally different when compared to Russia’s recently announced common bid with Kazakhstan and Belarus). The point is not that the four countries are not important political and economic actors on the world stage. The reality is that BRIC has a long way to go before surpassing G7 (as Russian analysts optimistically concluded). The message of the summit was not that BRIC is challenging the political and normative hegemony of the West, but that it is very capable of acting outside the US’ initiatives (notwithstanding the uncertainty as to what the next institutional step will be – the Secretary General of the Shanghai Organization declared that it is necessary to extend its roster). The impact of the meeting therefore mustn’t be accounted necessarily in relation to the formal results achieved by the four leaders, but to the BRIC countries’ capacity of enhancing their cooperation procedures and the reaction of the Western actors.
The agenda of the meeting was rather symbolic. The four states reaffirmed their commitment to not recognizing the independence of Kosovo. The foreign ministries of the BRIC countries implied that major breakthroughs are to be achieved in relation to the Doha negotiation rounds and that Brazil and India are to play a more prominent role in the UN. The four countries consider that due to their economic importance they are entitled to a more comprehensive representation in the international financial institutions. At the same time, the governments reaffirmed their commitment to overcoming the challenge posed by the global food crisis, stressing their efforts on ensuring food security.
The reasons why the results of this first meeting are rather symbolic are numerous. On the one hand, international observers wouldn’t expect any of the four countries to change their point of view on the Kosovo issue. Facing similar challenges themselves, and after expressing their serious disappointment on the way the US and several European countries chose to end the problem, the BRIC countries were obliged to maintain their position. The most surprising aspect is the fact that they chose to talk about the issue at a time when the international agenda was dominated by several other important topics (the topic of the international economic crisis, for example, wasn’t directly approached; neither was global warming or the WHO’s warning of imminent outbreaks of swine flu).
On the other hand, the demand for positive conclusions in the Doha round negotiations or the stress on the recognition the BRIC countries are entitled to, both in terms of prestige and institutional influence within the UN or the World Bank are long time grievances of the aforementioned crisis. The prospects of a major shift in the organizational structure of the UN or the redrawing of the influential positions of the World Bank are subjects that have been debated before and although there is a greater susceptivity to these demands than in the past, no plan or negotiation has yet to take these into account.
The rhetoric of the first BRIC summit is a combination between the four countries’ fears and desires. In spite of the optimistic comments of President Medvedev, BRIC is not a major economic and political pole as long as the only backing of that argument is summing up trade statistics. Although the meeting was seen only as the first step, the four countries or the Shanghai Organization do not have the cohesion and the coherence of the European Union (an institution whose importance Russia has always tried to downplay, insisting on the bilateral aspect of its foreign relations).
The four countries are important partners, but their common interests are still very diverse (taking the WTO as an example, the increasingly important role played by Brazil or India is totally different when compared to Russia’s recently announced common bid with Kazakhstan and Belarus). The point is not that the four countries are not important political and economic actors on the world stage. The reality is that BRIC has a long way to go before surpassing G7 (as Russian analysts optimistically concluded). The message of the summit was not that BRIC is challenging the political and normative hegemony of the West, but that it is very capable of acting outside the US’ initiatives (notwithstanding the uncertainty as to what the next institutional step will be – the Secretary General of the Shanghai Organization declared that it is necessary to extend its roster). The impact of the meeting therefore mustn’t be accounted necessarily in relation to the formal results achieved by the four leaders, but to the BRIC countries’ capacity of enhancing their cooperation procedures and the reaction of the Western actors.
