A New Start Treaty - A Restart of Russian-American Relation
Radu-Alexandru CUCUTA
April 21st, 2010
The closing of a New Nuclear Treaty between the US and Russia has been heralded as the main event of the past months. After intense negotiations, the Russian and the American political leaders have set out a deal that continues the series of Russian-American arms control agreements. The treaty continues the trend started with the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the 2002 Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty.
The contents of the deal may not seem far-reaching at first glance. The treaty’s provisions set out a new limit to armament reduction for both nations – the new threshold for operationally deployed warheads is 1550 (a figure almost 60% lower than the one set out by START 1 in 1991 and 30% lower than the provisions of the 2002 treaty). The treaty also limits the numbers of nuclear vectors – no more than 800 deployed and non-deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launchers, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) and nuclear bombers altogether are allowed by the new treaty. The treaty set a limit also for missiles – the parties are allowed to hold only 700 ICBMs, SLBMs and deployed nuclear bombers. Essentially, the treaty only furthers the provisions of previous deals; it maintains the strategic comfortable position of mutual assured destruction (in spite of the provisioned reduction of nuclear arsenals, both Russia and the US still posses 95% of the world’s nuclear arsenal and the second-strike capability, as well as the still impressive nuclear figures ensure that this strategic position is unchangeable in the foreseeable future).
However, the political context of the treaty’s signing and its possible implications single-out the new agreement from the previous nuclear Russian-American interactions. Although the treaty builds on the START framework, we have to take into account that the 1991 treaty was merely the formal expression of a political decision to cut-down nuclear arsenals – both the USSR and the United States took steps to limit and decrease their arsenals before the treaty’s entry into force. Moreover, the negotiation of the treaty was complicated by a factor that was not present during the 1991 negotiations – the issue of missile defense. Russia’s reluctance to accept the deployment of the American missile defense systems, coupled with a great animosity towards the Bush administration international policies were factors that the US didn’t have to factor into calculation at the beginning of the 90’s. Therefore, it is of great importance the fact that the new treaty tries to appease Russian fears (by tackling the issue of missile defense) – in Article 14 the treaty sets out the possibility of withdrawal from the treaty for “extraordinary circumstances”. The Russian view on the matter was that the clause can be invoked in case of serious “qualitative and quantitative” developments of the American missile defense system, capable of “threatening the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.”
At the same time, the fact that bilateral relations between the US and Russia are resumed after the all-time low they reached in wake of the Russian-Georgian war is a sign that the “resetting” of relations, heralded by Secretary Clinton has started out to pay results. Whether the treaty will be followed by an agreement over the deployment and limitation of the tactical nuclear arsenal (as Swedish and Polish foreign ministers have called for in an op-ed published by the New York Times) or by agreements over international issues the US is very interested in solving (the conduct of operations in Afghanistan, the problem of Iranian nuclear proliferation) still remains to be seen. But the treaty managed nevertheless to shape a new political context that makes new cooperation procedures more probable.
Radu-Alexandru CUCUTA
April 21st, 2010
The closing of a New Nuclear Treaty between the US and Russia has been heralded as the main event of the past months. After intense negotiations, the Russian and the American political leaders have set out a deal that continues the series of Russian-American arms control agreements. The treaty continues the trend started with the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the 2002 Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty.
The contents of the deal may not seem far-reaching at first glance. The treaty’s provisions set out a new limit to armament reduction for both nations – the new threshold for operationally deployed warheads is 1550 (a figure almost 60% lower than the one set out by START 1 in 1991 and 30% lower than the provisions of the 2002 treaty). The treaty also limits the numbers of nuclear vectors – no more than 800 deployed and non-deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launchers, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) and nuclear bombers altogether are allowed by the new treaty. The treaty set a limit also for missiles – the parties are allowed to hold only 700 ICBMs, SLBMs and deployed nuclear bombers. Essentially, the treaty only furthers the provisions of previous deals; it maintains the strategic comfortable position of mutual assured destruction (in spite of the provisioned reduction of nuclear arsenals, both Russia and the US still posses 95% of the world’s nuclear arsenal and the second-strike capability, as well as the still impressive nuclear figures ensure that this strategic position is unchangeable in the foreseeable future).
However, the political context of the treaty’s signing and its possible implications single-out the new agreement from the previous nuclear Russian-American interactions. Although the treaty builds on the START framework, we have to take into account that the 1991 treaty was merely the formal expression of a political decision to cut-down nuclear arsenals – both the USSR and the United States took steps to limit and decrease their arsenals before the treaty’s entry into force. Moreover, the negotiation of the treaty was complicated by a factor that was not present during the 1991 negotiations – the issue of missile defense. Russia’s reluctance to accept the deployment of the American missile defense systems, coupled with a great animosity towards the Bush administration international policies were factors that the US didn’t have to factor into calculation at the beginning of the 90’s. Therefore, it is of great importance the fact that the new treaty tries to appease Russian fears (by tackling the issue of missile defense) – in Article 14 the treaty sets out the possibility of withdrawal from the treaty for “extraordinary circumstances”. The Russian view on the matter was that the clause can be invoked in case of serious “qualitative and quantitative” developments of the American missile defense system, capable of “threatening the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.”
At the same time, the fact that bilateral relations between the US and Russia are resumed after the all-time low they reached in wake of the Russian-Georgian war is a sign that the “resetting” of relations, heralded by Secretary Clinton has started out to pay results. Whether the treaty will be followed by an agreement over the deployment and limitation of the tactical nuclear arsenal (as Swedish and Polish foreign ministers have called for in an op-ed published by the New York Times) or by agreements over international issues the US is very interested in solving (the conduct of operations in Afghanistan, the problem of Iranian nuclear proliferation) still remains to be seen. But the treaty managed nevertheless to shape a new political context that makes new cooperation procedures more probable.
