Beyond the new Cold War: the “the reset summit” Horia BARBULESCU
July 13 2009
Between the 6th and the 8th of July, the American president, Barack Obama, made a visit to Moscow. During the visit, Obama met the president of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedevand the Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin. The problems discussed included, among others, the issue of the American missile shield, the reduction of the American and Russian strategic arsenals and the situation of Afghanistan. Also, the American president held a speech at the New Economic School in Moscow. During the speech, he made references to the relation between Washington and Moscow and to the role of the Russian Federation and the USA on the international scene. (RIA Novosti, Itar-Tass,Washington Post)
In order to have a conclusive image on the impact of the American president’s visit to Moscow it is necessary to pay attention to the moments before the visit, when Barack Obama presented to the Russian press the premises of this summit. Among these, the American president mentioned the fact that the USA remains a military superpower and the greatest economy of the world. Then why does it negotiate with an ex-superpower that passes through a post-imperial transition? Because she is compelled to act in an environment characterized by interdependence where partnership should be the rule, says Obama. We might add the necessity for measures that reduce the Russian threat perception and the need to obtain a more supportive attitude concerning Afghanistan.
Considered the great achievement of the Russian-American summit, the permission to transit the Russian air space with American soldiers and military equipment is aligned to the recent tendency inaugurated by the re-acceptance of the Manas. I approached this subject in a previous analysis. Obtaining a firm commitment towards combating drug trafficking is not negligible but this problem should be tackled “at root”, i.e. in Afghanistan.
Concerning the reduction of the nuclear arsenal of both states, an analyst from the Heritage Foundation (probably an adept of the zero sum game perspective on international relations) said that the Americans have obtained an insignificant gain from this agreement. Her argument was that the Russian nuclear arsenal is outdated anyway and has a high maintenance cost and Moscow would gladly accept a nuclear “house-cleaning”. Even so, we could say that Obama and Washington gained in terms of reputation, proving that they want to get close to the ideal of a world “free of nuclear weapons”. This argument would have certainly been rejected by any neoconservative analyst. Anyway, the agreement to reduce the nuclear arsenals is a welcomed confidence-building measure in the context of the tension that dominated the Russian-American relations especially in the second term of Bush Jr. Moreover, the mix of nuclear weapons and tension is considered, especially in Obama’s discourse, a relic of the Cold War that still haunts the Russian-American relations.
The issue of the missile shield that the USA wants to place in Europe didn’t receive a substantial approach. The measure concerning the development of a “Data Exchange Center”, a system for multilateral notification of worldwide missile launches is more or less symbolic. Of course this problem decisively depends on finding a solution to that of Iran’s nuclearization. This last one remained unclear at least at the public level. The standoffish attitude of this administration towards the missile shield certainly frustrates some east-European countries, especially Poland, but this shouldn’t come as a surprise. Obama has a term full of troublesome issues and it was evident, even during his campaign, that the European ex-soviet space and the ex-socialist camp will be areas in which he will invest sensibly less resources. Some analysts have warned that this line of action will lead to the Russian Federation reasserting her influence in her “sphere of influence”. It remains to be seen if the European Union and the other international actors will have the capacity and the will to act in order to reduce this likely pressure.
Moreover, in the view of the current American administration, the importance of the geopolitical thinking in terms of “spheres of influence” has diminished in the present circumstances, rising interdependence being a decisive factor. A transition can be foreseen from an approach based on “great games” towards one based on something resembling a condominium of a concert of power (H. Kissinger).
During his speech at the New Economic School, the American president has affirmed some things that were either only whispered or they haven’t been explicitly stated before. One of these is the fact that the West needs a strong Russian Federation, capable of solving its problems and of participating in the management of the global ones. Moreover, Obama referred to the Euro Atlantic aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine which are now postponed until the “majority of its people will choose to” adhere and until these countries will undertake reforms and will be able to contribute to NATO’s missions.
As for the state of democracy in the Russian Federation, Obama presented a few teachings from a superpower towards an ex-superpower. Although the USA will not try to impose its system of government on any other country, history has shown that only the governments which serve the interest of their citizens survive and thrive. Not taking into consideration the discourse technique of resorting to a transcendent argument –History, not the USA shows the way to be, the reference is meant to remind the Russian partners of the end of the Cold War, the fall of communism and the dismemberment of the USSR. In Obama’s logic of discourse these events seem to show that only governments which support the rule of law and the will of their citizens are successful. It is unclear what “people’s will” means, especially in the Russian Federation, or how can meetings with a fragile Russian opposition encourage change towards democracy.
In conclusion, “the reset summit” doesn’t look like a decisive diplomatic victory for either of the participants and analysts seeking to interpret it in terms of absolute gains and losses would inevitably err. This is because the realist logic or the geopolitical explanations don’t have the monopoly over answers to the current global issues. Variables like interdependence and soft-power (so denigrated in some academic and decisional circles) are elements equally useful for a successful framework of analysis.
Considered the great achievement of the Russian-American summit, the permission to transit the Russian air space with American soldiers and military equipment is aligned to the recent tendency inaugurated by the re-acceptance of the Manas. I approached this subject in a previous analysis. Obtaining a firm commitment towards combating drug trafficking is not negligible but this problem should be tackled “at root”, i.e. in Afghanistan.
Concerning the reduction of the nuclear arsenal of both states, an analyst from the Heritage Foundation (probably an adept of the zero sum game perspective on international relations) said that the Americans have obtained an insignificant gain from this agreement. Her argument was that the Russian nuclear arsenal is outdated anyway and has a high maintenance cost and Moscow would gladly accept a nuclear “house-cleaning”. Even so, we could say that Obama and Washington gained in terms of reputation, proving that they want to get close to the ideal of a world “free of nuclear weapons”. This argument would have certainly been rejected by any neoconservative analyst. Anyway, the agreement to reduce the nuclear arsenals is a welcomed confidence-building measure in the context of the tension that dominated the Russian-American relations especially in the second term of Bush Jr. Moreover, the mix of nuclear weapons and tension is considered, especially in Obama’s discourse, a relic of the Cold War that still haunts the Russian-American relations.
The issue of the missile shield that the USA wants to place in Europe didn’t receive a substantial approach. The measure concerning the development of a “Data Exchange Center”, a system for multilateral notification of worldwide missile launches is more or less symbolic. Of course this problem decisively depends on finding a solution to that of Iran’s nuclearization. This last one remained unclear at least at the public level. The standoffish attitude of this administration towards the missile shield certainly frustrates some east-European countries, especially Poland, but this shouldn’t come as a surprise. Obama has a term full of troublesome issues and it was evident, even during his campaign, that the European ex-soviet space and the ex-socialist camp will be areas in which he will invest sensibly less resources. Some analysts have warned that this line of action will lead to the Russian Federation reasserting her influence in her “sphere of influence”. It remains to be seen if the European Union and the other international actors will have the capacity and the will to act in order to reduce this likely pressure.
Moreover, in the view of the current American administration, the importance of the geopolitical thinking in terms of “spheres of influence” has diminished in the present circumstances, rising interdependence being a decisive factor. A transition can be foreseen from an approach based on “great games” towards one based on something resembling a condominium of a concert of power (H. Kissinger).
During his speech at the New Economic School, the American president has affirmed some things that were either only whispered or they haven’t been explicitly stated before. One of these is the fact that the West needs a strong Russian Federation, capable of solving its problems and of participating in the management of the global ones. Moreover, Obama referred to the Euro Atlantic aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine which are now postponed until the “majority of its people will choose to” adhere and until these countries will undertake reforms and will be able to contribute to NATO’s missions.
As for the state of democracy in the Russian Federation, Obama presented a few teachings from a superpower towards an ex-superpower. Although the USA will not try to impose its system of government on any other country, history has shown that only the governments which serve the interest of their citizens survive and thrive. Not taking into consideration the discourse technique of resorting to a transcendent argument –History, not the USA shows the way to be, the reference is meant to remind the Russian partners of the end of the Cold War, the fall of communism and the dismemberment of the USSR. In Obama’s logic of discourse these events seem to show that only governments which support the rule of law and the will of their citizens are successful. It is unclear what “people’s will” means, especially in the Russian Federation, or how can meetings with a fragile Russian opposition encourage change towards democracy.
In conclusion, “the reset summit” doesn’t look like a decisive diplomatic victory for either of the participants and analysts seeking to interpret it in terms of absolute gains and losses would inevitably err. This is because the realist logic or the geopolitical explanations don’t have the monopoly over answers to the current global issues. Variables like interdependence and soft-power (so denigrated in some academic and decisional circles) are elements equally useful for a successful framework of analysis.
