China and North Korean ambitions
Horia BARBULESCU
30 mai 2009
On the 25th of May 2009, North Korea has conducted an underground nuclear test, subsequently performing short-range missile tests. These events, accompanied by the threat with a military strike against its South Korean neighbor underlined the need for an answer of the states concerned by regional and global security. Russia emphasized on the diplomatic character of any responses to Pyongyang actions and accepted the negotiation of a resolution of the UN Security Council. The government of the People’s Republic of China declared that it resolutely opposes the North Korean nuclear test. The US and South Korean troops have raise their alert level, but the American’s rhetorical reaction was moderate. North Korea criticized the countries on the UN Security Council and threatened that in case of a new resolution it will take new self-defense measures. (Xinhua, RIA Novosti, Itar Tass, Los Angeles Times).
For China, the North Korean issue constitutes an opportunity to keep the USA busy. The recent events will not radically change Beijing’s attitude. Nevertheless, the two types of tests –the detonation and the short-missiles- combined with the aggressive rhetoric signal a different development compared to the previous crises. Although we lack the intelligence about North Korea and its relations with its traditional patron we can try to present some interpretations and then decide which one of them is more plausible.
The first analysis takes into consideration China’s attempt to further advance in the international game the asset called North Korea. This scenario is based on the assumption that the client-patron relationship is functional and Beijing encourages, although rhetorically opposes, the evolution towards recognizing North Korea as a nuclear power. The main reason for China choosing this course of events is the present power circumstances on the international scene. Beijing is seemingly gaining more and more clout while the US power is declining influenced in part by the economic crisis. The situation can be used by China, inter alia, as a test to see how the other regional and global powers behave in a crisis such as this one. Another reason that justifies such an interpretation is China’s reserved reaction towards the evolution of events.
However, the above mentioned scenario doesn’t seem credible: Pyongyang is a regime kept alive by foreign aid and is not a credible threat. First of all, even though nuclearized North Korea doesn’t yet have the proper vectors to scare Japan into an arms race. Even if it had vectors, Japan is protected by the American anti-missile capabilities. As for South Korea, an attack on it would mean the end of the Pyongyang regime and China surely doesn’t want that.
The other interpretation is linked to the way in which North Korea seems to have set her ambitions through its declarations. This scenario is based on the assumption that, at the level of generated perceptions, Pyongyang also added to its “nuisance to the West” nature the attitude of a client that defies its patron. The North Korean reactions condemning the members of the UNSC for their hypocrisy may raise suspicions that, at least rhetorically, Pyongyang crossed the line. China and Russia are permanent members of the UNSC. Although it started to impose as a great power that wants to prove its influence, China must also show responsibility. Moreover, Beijing is committed, at least at the rhetorical level, to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as it is stated in China’s latest National Defense Paper. The lack of a strong reaction from China may be interpreted as a maneuver in order to mask that it is infuriated with Pyongyang’s attempt to boost its standing at the expense of regional stability. Beijing doesn’t want to publicly criticize a regime that it strives to maintain. One thing is certain: the North Korean regime is passing through a transition of power. In order to live through this moment it needs to resume its usual actions: aggressive rhetoric and bellicose actions and the reiteration of its nuclear status. On the other hand, this time the convergence of the threat factors is unusual, as if something decisive is about to happen. The moment for changing the leadership is near and the regime wants to boost its status.
The Chinese are patient, as always, but they will try to reduce tensions keeping in mind two things: the regime in Pyongyang must remain in place until they have enough power to impose their own rules in the region and their relations with the USA must not deteriorate. A UNSC resolution will be adopted next week, while the Chinese might attempt to calm Pyongyang. If this attempt succeeds the UN resolution will be “mild” and it will be applied as inefficiently as the previous ones. On the other hand, if these sanctions will take form of those that affect the elites and not the people, the regime might find itself in a worse situation than this one. As for Russia, it tried to present itself as an exemplary actor in the international community showing that it is willing to concessions. Its attitude is only natural since it is the least affected actor by the recent events.
For the USA and South Korea the events are business as usual and the American declarations oscillated between moderate anger and denying the existence of a crisis. We can see that the US has accepted the “fait accompli” of a nuclear North Korea, although they publicly deny this. China and the US need one another and they will play down the importance of this new crisis. But there is an essential element upon which the Americans will stress –maybe even in the negotiations for the resolution: stopping Pyongyang from selling or transferring nuclear material abroad. The North Koreans have a history of selling arms to actors which are hostile to the West. If their “toys” end up in the hands of terrorists nobody will be happy, much less China.
Horia BARBULESCU
30 mai 2009
On the 25th of May 2009, North Korea has conducted an underground nuclear test, subsequently performing short-range missile tests. These events, accompanied by the threat with a military strike against its South Korean neighbor underlined the need for an answer of the states concerned by regional and global security. Russia emphasized on the diplomatic character of any responses to Pyongyang actions and accepted the negotiation of a resolution of the UN Security Council. The government of the People’s Republic of China declared that it resolutely opposes the North Korean nuclear test. The US and South Korean troops have raise their alert level, but the American’s rhetorical reaction was moderate. North Korea criticized the countries on the UN Security Council and threatened that in case of a new resolution it will take new self-defense measures. (Xinhua, RIA Novosti, Itar Tass, Los Angeles Times).
For China, the North Korean issue constitutes an opportunity to keep the USA busy. The recent events will not radically change Beijing’s attitude. Nevertheless, the two types of tests –the detonation and the short-missiles- combined with the aggressive rhetoric signal a different development compared to the previous crises. Although we lack the intelligence about North Korea and its relations with its traditional patron we can try to present some interpretations and then decide which one of them is more plausible.
The first analysis takes into consideration China’s attempt to further advance in the international game the asset called North Korea. This scenario is based on the assumption that the client-patron relationship is functional and Beijing encourages, although rhetorically opposes, the evolution towards recognizing North Korea as a nuclear power. The main reason for China choosing this course of events is the present power circumstances on the international scene. Beijing is seemingly gaining more and more clout while the US power is declining influenced in part by the economic crisis. The situation can be used by China, inter alia, as a test to see how the other regional and global powers behave in a crisis such as this one. Another reason that justifies such an interpretation is China’s reserved reaction towards the evolution of events.
However, the above mentioned scenario doesn’t seem credible: Pyongyang is a regime kept alive by foreign aid and is not a credible threat. First of all, even though nuclearized North Korea doesn’t yet have the proper vectors to scare Japan into an arms race. Even if it had vectors, Japan is protected by the American anti-missile capabilities. As for South Korea, an attack on it would mean the end of the Pyongyang regime and China surely doesn’t want that.
The other interpretation is linked to the way in which North Korea seems to have set her ambitions through its declarations. This scenario is based on the assumption that, at the level of generated perceptions, Pyongyang also added to its “nuisance to the West” nature the attitude of a client that defies its patron. The North Korean reactions condemning the members of the UNSC for their hypocrisy may raise suspicions that, at least rhetorically, Pyongyang crossed the line. China and Russia are permanent members of the UNSC. Although it started to impose as a great power that wants to prove its influence, China must also show responsibility. Moreover, Beijing is committed, at least at the rhetorical level, to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as it is stated in China’s latest National Defense Paper. The lack of a strong reaction from China may be interpreted as a maneuver in order to mask that it is infuriated with Pyongyang’s attempt to boost its standing at the expense of regional stability. Beijing doesn’t want to publicly criticize a regime that it strives to maintain. One thing is certain: the North Korean regime is passing through a transition of power. In order to live through this moment it needs to resume its usual actions: aggressive rhetoric and bellicose actions and the reiteration of its nuclear status. On the other hand, this time the convergence of the threat factors is unusual, as if something decisive is about to happen. The moment for changing the leadership is near and the regime wants to boost its status.
The Chinese are patient, as always, but they will try to reduce tensions keeping in mind two things: the regime in Pyongyang must remain in place until they have enough power to impose their own rules in the region and their relations with the USA must not deteriorate. A UNSC resolution will be adopted next week, while the Chinese might attempt to calm Pyongyang. If this attempt succeeds the UN resolution will be “mild” and it will be applied as inefficiently as the previous ones. On the other hand, if these sanctions will take form of those that affect the elites and not the people, the regime might find itself in a worse situation than this one. As for Russia, it tried to present itself as an exemplary actor in the international community showing that it is willing to concessions. Its attitude is only natural since it is the least affected actor by the recent events.
For the USA and South Korea the events are business as usual and the American declarations oscillated between moderate anger and denying the existence of a crisis. We can see that the US has accepted the “fait accompli” of a nuclear North Korea, although they publicly deny this. China and the US need one another and they will play down the importance of this new crisis. But there is an essential element upon which the Americans will stress –maybe even in the negotiations for the resolution: stopping Pyongyang from selling or transferring nuclear material abroad. The North Koreans have a history of selling arms to actors which are hostile to the West. If their “toys” end up in the hands of terrorists nobody will be happy, much less China.
