Medvedev’s interview– a “truly revealing look at Russia”?

 

Simona SOARE

January 10, 2010 

 

 

Fareed Zakaria interviewed Russian President Dmitri Medvedev for his CNN show, GPS. The interview, recorded in late September 2009, was broadcast on December 27, 2009. During the interview, a few of the most important issues in regional and global politicsare reviewed, among which I should quote the real locus of power in Russian domestic politics, the possibility of Medvedev running for president again in 2012, the differences in vision between the president and the prime minister, the relationship with the US and the Obama administration, the relationship with Iran and the possibility of Israel attacking Iran, etc.

 

At first site, the interviewseems substantial. Zakaria presents it as “still the most comprehensive interview [president Medvedev]’s given since assuming office a year-and-a-half ago, and it's a truly revealing look at Russia.” Zakaria’s questions areimportant and relevant for today’s international politics, though he seems subjective in qualifying the interview as a truly revealing look at Russia. It’s really a shame that the answers of president Medvedev are not meeting the expectations of such an interview. The president’s answers are simple and deliberately vague, in strong opposition to the powerful leader he likes to portray himself as. There are questions he avoids answering, such as those regarding his power in domestic politics, and then there are questions he deliberately answers vaguely, such as the questions regarding Iran and the possibility of Israel attacking Iran, while expressing a kind of confidence that comes off as completely unsubstantiated.

 

The first part of the interview focuses on the internal struggle for power in Russian domestic politics. Zakaria presents the struggle as a sort of epic polarization of Russian society among the two great poles of domestic power: Vladimir Putin, the police-state, autocratic leader and Dmitri Medvedev, the leader of the modern, young Russia, connected to the world and with great liberal aspirations. This portrayal of Russia is only partially correct and this is reflected in president Medvedev’s answers. When asked if he is the “boss” of Vladimir Putin, president Medvedev’s answer strides to the diplomatic version and cites the Constitution. However, the Russian Constitution depicts the separation of powers and attributions between the two leaders of the Russian executive, and not a direct subordination relationship between them or the informal power support they may have. The president, quite expectedly, makes no reference to his domestic power support base and the relative influence he has in comparison to Putin.

 

Medvedev is being even more vague in his answer to the question of whether he is more liberal than Prime Minister Putin. He agrees that there are “differences” in political vision, but then he claims that he and Putin are similarly “liberal” apparently because they have a similar educational background. This is no guarantee though that their liberal formation is leading them both towards similar decisions. It also comes off quite suspiciously, if Medvedev is more liberal in his views that Prime Minister Putin, and the constitutional “boss” of the later, why hasn’t he passed distinguishably more liberal policies in Russia since taking office almost two years ago!

 

In his latest article, “Go Russia”, president Medvedev points to serious problems in Russian domestic as well as foreign policy – this implies a certain criticism of his Prime Minister’s past and present work. He seems to make a clear distinction though that it’s one thing for him to acknowledge Russia's faults, but it’s a completely different one for the US (reference to Joe Biden’sarticle on Russian weakness) to do so. However, Medvedev seems disinclined to acquits a larger profile in foreign policy (other than being on foreign trips all the time, which he himself mentions) and in promoting a more liberal foreign policy than the one implemented by Putin (which he seems quite happywith continuing). Quite to the contrary to what Medvedev claims, that there is just one man who does it in foreign policy in Russia – the president – the fact that he is on foreign trips all the time, and he signs all the papers does not tell us much about whether he is really in charge. In fact, what it does tell us is that Russia has an oversized, inefficient bureaucratic apparatus, and that the current president’s power is inevitably tied to it. Of course, answering this question brings negative publicity either way – if he’s not in charge, then he’s Putin’s puppet which is bad for his already shaky support in Russia and his credibility abroad; and if he is really in charge, then he is no more than an autocratic leader, driving Russia further away from liberal, transparent democracy.

 

Another similarly disconcerting answer is whether Medvedev is poised to run for another mandate in 2012.President Medvedev’s answer is positive and tellingly indicative – “if the conditions are right.

 

The interview’s second part focuses on US-Russia relations. As expected, president Medvedev does not hide his particular disenchantment with the former Bush administration and his regard for president Obama. Despite the diplomatic protocol which he quotes as ameasure of their closeness and good relations – which are indeed telling to a certain degree – one of the things president Medvedev seems to appreciate most about the US leader is his inclination to “listen to your arguments.” Of course, this would seem to satisfy one of Russia’s long-held aspirations – to be “heard” in international politics. But the uncertainty surrounding the power relations between leaders within Russia does more harm to its global role than its diminished power base. One condition for having a voice in international politics is that other great powers know who they’re talking to, and they’re talking to those leaders whom can influence decision-making in Russia. Not knowing for sure who is in that position in Moscow now is not an asset for Russia’s global role.

 

The pragmatism of president Medvedev - and indeed of Russian politics – comes off in his answer regarding the fact that while his good personal relations with president Obama matter a great deal, it’s “results” that people are expecting of him. And in this department he is way behind. The West reacted skeptically to his June 2008 security proposal of creating encompassing security architecture “from Vancouverto Vladivostok” (Moscow Times, July 20, 2008). The issue ofthe US missile shield has yet to be satisfactorily resolved for Moscow. Iran continues to be a majorpoint of disagreement between Russia and the West (particularly the US), etc.

 

The third part of the interview is dedicated to Iran’s nuclear program and the possibility of Israel attacking Iran as a defense measure against the latter acquiring nuclear weapons. When asked if Russia is willing to undertake its responsibilities as a great power and press Iran to give up its military nuclear programme, president Medvedev avoids answering and instead insists that it is Iran’s responsibility to cooperate with the IAEA, not its choice to do so. Only when Zakaria insists in asking the question again, does Medvedev offer a tellingly substantial answer: “Of course, of course.” Not only is this answer a measure of Russia’s lack of willingness to undertake these responsibilities as a great power regarding Iran, but the Russian president is more intent on transmitting a sort of confidence about how things are to go down that seems completely unsubstantiated. He does not, at any point in the interview, assume the responsibility that Russia will press Iran to give up its nuclear weapons programme simply because Moscow is not yet apparently convinced that the Iranians are indeed pursuing such a project. Only Iran’s refusal to cooperate with the IAEA islikely to spark their suspicions – which one must wonder why hasn’t it happened so far given Tehran’s reluctance in complying with IAEA inspections. After all, it appears that Putin’s “Security for each is security for all” (Munich speech, 2007) in fact reads: security for Russia is not necessarily security for all! 

 

When asked about Moscow’s repeated threats to sell Iran advanced S-300 air defense systems – initially as a deterrent against US and Israeli threats to attack Iran – president Medvedev dismisses the claims and says they are “defensive systems” so Russia is not overstepping any international law regulations. Of course S-300 is a defensive system. But then again so are a few nuclear warheads. It’s a matter of perception – what are they defending? Under these circumstances there are a series of Western leaders accusing Russia of trying to bolster Iranian defenses so as to protect Tehran’s truly offensive intentions regarding its military nuclear programme.

 

President Medvedev unlinks the transfer of S-300s to Iran from the threat of Israeli attack on Iran by arguing that as defensive systems they do not increase danger – hence, they don’t modify the balance of power in the region. This is a misrepresentation of the balance of power in the Middle East. Russia portrays the transfer as a means to reduce danger in the Middle East – but the question is: reduce the danger to whom? Moreover, Medvedev quotes an alleged pledge President Peres made him in Sochi earlier last year, that Israel will not attack Iran and he claims to trust this pledge. In this case, why would there be such a serious danger to Iran that it needs one of the most advanced anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems in the world to protect itself? In addition, when asked whether Russia would support Iran in the case of an Israeli attack on it, president Medvedev declines and points to the need to weigh such an attack cautiously because of the dynamics that it could unleash in the region – a clear indication that Russia has in fact thought it over despite the alleged assurances from the Israelis that they will not attack.

 

All in all, it seems a rather disappointing interview in which one can only take a “truly revealing look at Russia” if one learns to read between the lines, to accept serious logical contradictions as politically-relevant intentions and reassurance and to look over vagueness as diplomacy. But then again, perhaps this is what Russia truly strives to be.