Georgian-Russian Relations as the Epicenter of the Black Sea-Caucasus Region Dynamics
Octavian MILEVSCHI
Starting at the beginning of 2000s the Euro-Atlantic integration that took shape through consecutive waves of enlargement to the east of the continent favored the conceptualization of the Wider Black Sea Area as the next shore for extending a region of stability and collective security on the European continent and with a view to creating a true politically united Europe. Together with the post-Soviet Black Sea riparian states, these designs comprised Georgia as well and considered the latter’s integrative thrust within the framework of a window of opportunity that was to bear fruit as soon as possible, but probably no latter than the end of the decade. At least, this was the way it was seen by many from Brussels, Washington and some other central east European capitals.
On the greater regional chessboard this strategy had and still has Russia as the main contender, the actions of which take root in a number of historically pervasive foreign policy constants, that can shortly be enumerated as 1) the perception of losing grip on its border areas, internalized as its exclusive sphere of influence; 2) apprehension for lessening economic fortunes, mainly related to the new energy corridors that are developing parallel to or against Russia’s interests; 3) its territoriality instinct, which can be read through the lens of a loose neo-imperial design, and 4) Russia’s identity quest and its great power place in an emerging multipolar world. Thus from the Russian official vantage point, relations with Georgia are implicitly considered the litmus test of the former’s pervasive foreign policy constants and explicitly its regional standing.
A year and a half after the Russo-Georgian short war that changed the regional order, the integrative window of opportunity seems rigidly closed. Thus, the August conflict doesn’t look so much like a black swan event now, as it used to be in August 2008 and immediately after, but rather as a tipping point that was reached in a process of counteraction, the beginning of which can be traced somewhere in the early to mid 2000s.
In the aftermath of the five-day conflict, many experts and public figures have kept contributing to the general debate on the multi-level consequences of the war. Many of them dismantled any myth about the righteousness or legitimacy of the two protagonists to start the August war, as for example the Tagliavini report has shown. It goes without saying that the bulk of the blow was and is carried by the Georgian state and nation. Moreover, the reverberations of the war do have a pervasive impact on the wider Black Sea regional posture. Placing Georgia at the epicenter of the regional evolution, the new picture conceptualized after the logic of concentric circles is seen to cause new tectonic shifts that are to reverberate to the Caucasian countries and their regions, both north and south, Turkey, post-Soviet space and further on the wider regional and continental level.
Where does Georgia stand now? On January the 5th 2010, Mikheil Saakashvili has ended his second year of his second presidential mandate, reaching his seventh year of presidency. To say that his one and a half mandate until present has been a failure it would be wrong, although to deem it a success would be wrong, too. On the one hand, Georgia has made some visible progress in some areas of economy, state institutions building and governance, being not long ago rightfully given as the example of successful transition of the post-Soviet states to modern liberal democracies, to dynamic economies and integration into the Western institutions. On the other hand, as it became incrementally clear the last 2-3 years, Saakashvili’s Georgia is still comparable to the Georgia of Shevardnadze or, worse, Gamsachurdya. It has become strikingly evident that for the majority of its citizens, the country is not significantly better than it was 15 or 10 years ago. The August conflict and its aftermath brought the Georgian society in front of a virtual blocking wall on its perceived 200 years road to the West and raised a series of existential questions to the development model it had followed until then. Here is the reality of its standing.
First, the common bitter wisdom nowadays is that Georgia is officially no more sovereign over its entire territory and this stands to last for many years to come. Evidently, the current state might have a painfully discouraging and victimizing impact on the Georgian national psyche and push Georgia in a vicious circle whereby the two secessionist hot spots with relatively little economic importance would drain too much of Georgia’s scarce resources. Moreover, the recognition of the two territories by a great power has raised the chances of their survivability in time and their capacity to engulf Georgia in this pernicious game.
Second, with the South Osetian gamble, the legitimacy of the Saakashvili regime has been put under considerable international and internal scrutiny. Although still displaying a relatively strong grip on power while contested by a not very strong and divided opposition, the image of Saakashvili, at least outside Georgia, is much closer to a lame duck. Three years before the end of his mandate, the question of political change already stands high in the public sphere. Moreover, the question looms heavy, when will Georgia have a smooth, institutional, bureaucratic and not an emotional political change? Given that the Georgian state system remains quite centralized, personalities continue to play a crucial role. Thus, Georgia’s future depends very much on the quality of the one to be elected and this is where very much depends on the wisdom of the Georgian elites.
Third, as the former imperial center, Russia, has made of Georgia’s strategic orientation one of the focal points of its great power re-emergence. For Georgians, geography is destiny, and it has reconfirmed an old painful dictum in Georgia, and for that matter the other post-Soviet states as well, that the West is desirable but not fully attainable, while Russia is undesirable but not fully alienable. The perception of it in Georgia is that a spoiler Russia is trying to destabilize Georgia and to take over the country from within politically and economically, to keep it as un-attractive as possible to the West for as long as possible, accentuating the incertitude of its strategic identity. Thus, it leaves Georgia in an existential dilemma: it would under no condition bandwagon Russia, but it cannot and it is not allowed to integrate into the west as well.
Fourth, for the time being, Georgia’s strategic position as, maybe, the most important link-state of the Black Sea-Caucasus area with the pivotal Azerbaijan, energy rich Central Asia and continental bridge Turkey, seems more fragile than ever. The August war and its fallout gave an impetus to new strategic options and cooperative imagination to Georgia’s eastern and southern neighbors, thus opening a dialogue on their perennial problems, such as the Armenia-Karabah-Azerbaijan stalemate or the Turkish-Armenian debacle. Thus, the prospects of Georgia’s unique regional transit position for energy may become a matter of the past and with it Georgia’s main ‘resource’ source may be diminished. This is not to say that Russia’s lots have improved, since the war made Armenia more open-minded towards other regional and extra-regional actors, endangering Russia’s perceived quasi-exclusiveness in relations with Armenia.
Fifth, the would-be global patron of Georgia, USA, has given unconvincing signs as to its commitment to Georgia’s fate, notwithstanding Joe Biden’s re-invigorating rhetoric, bilateral Georgian-US strategic partnership charter, all kinds of political, military or economic pledges and declarative tenets. To all evidence, and for reasons related to Iran, Afghanistan and nuclear non-proliferation, Georgia remains a marginal issue to the USA. By virtue of its loneliness as a superpower, US cannot be totally engulfed into the Georgia-Russia stalemate. According to the US official transcript, it needs to meet pragmatism with principle, a thing it cannot achieve overnight and without the contribution of other great players, Russia being among them.
Still, thinking Georgia’s evolution on the US agenda would be incomplete without taking into consideration the greater regional dynamics around Iran. Since the ayatollahs’ regime evolves towards rigidity and in search for an external enemy in order to bolster its internal legitimacy, it is highly probable that it will step up its confrontation rhetoric and nuclear military program. In this case, Georgia’s tarnished strategic position might re-acquire its value. Namely in such a scenario will the U.S. genuinely re-assert its commitment, with a view to create a place d’armes in the gloomy eventuality of a military confrontation with Iran.
Sixth, Georgia’s NATO membership plans are off the agenda, at best. Not even the most devout Euro-Atlanticist NATO members would openly vouch for a hypothetical Georgian suitability with the standards and values of NATO. Seemingly, as the USA, Germany and France could not agree on how to defend Georgia, the lesson taught by Russia is that destruction of their weaker allies means more division among strong NATO countries. Besides, the benefits of Georgia’s membership seem to them, after NATO’s hesitant stance, even more dubious.
Seventh, Georgia’s only long term hope, the EU is still in a state of defining its regional approach one month since the Lisbon treaty in effect. The promising object of its effectiveness and commitment still stands to be seen in the short to mid run. The necessary pre-conditions seem to be in place once Georgia will begin to feel the benefits and meet the conditions stipulated through the Eastern Partnership Agreement and suchlike instruments. Still, the EU is currently open only towards compensatory regionalism, which in reality should be read a gesture for exclusion. Nonetheless, the relationship with the EU remains the only hope Georgia has been left with. The nature of the EU as an actor is different from NATO or US, consequently Georgia’s conduct will have to change as well. Moreover, the EU may be the only means of a Georgian smart approach towards the two breakaway regions, based on de-escalation and de-politicized dialogue. Where does Russia stand now?
Until one year ago Russia was a 20th century declining power. After the 08.08, it has become what apparently it so much longed for - a 19th century victorious power, albeit still declining, in a very volatile regional environment and highly probably at dubious long-term costs. Conspiracy aside, Russia, with the inept contribution of some Georgian circles, reached a position that it craved for quite some time and that infused it with hope that the right approach to avoid its perennial geographical, social and economic fears is in the right place and time.
First, at least for the time being, by teaching Georgia a harsh lesson for its defiant wish to become part of the West, Russia re-acquired the recognition of its special status as a regional “custodian”, implying that it either sidelined or even excluded any serious actors from its most sensitive South, i.e. OSCE, the UN, the Council of Europe, and even EU and, its idée fixe - NATO.
Second, it gave food for thought to those post-Soviet states that seek integration with the West, mainly the Ukraine and Moldova, as to the feasibility of their orientation and the costs that can be incurred by Russia. It made clear to these neighbor countries that they remain in Russia's backyard and should behave accordingly.
Third, somehow confirming Russia’s perception of the informal regional condominium that so many read through the lines, it gave an additional impetus to Turkey’s new regional foreign policy review process, as expressed through the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, for instance, whereby Turkey and Russia are to share regional responsibilities, keeping at a distance other actors, mainly the USA, NATO and EU. On the other hand, Turkey should not be taken for granted, as it seems to be one of the very few actors capable to effectively invalidate Russia’s exclusivity in Abkhazia, by virtue of its hundred thousands strong Abkhazian diaspora, and, why not as a new emerging soft power attraction pole in the South Caucasus. Besides, Turkey’s stance towards the South Caucasus is not at all at odds with NATO’s or EU’s regional aspirations, provided that Turkey keeps its strategic orientation towards integration into the EU.
Fourth, by recognizing Abkhazia and South Osetia, for the long run it created a dangerous precedent for its internal subjects. Let us not forget that the restless North Caucasus, but not also, has far more viable regions than Abkhazia, let alone South Osetia, with no less legitimate grievances than the first two. In November 2009, Medvedev assessed the status quo in the Northern Caucasus as “the most serious internal political problem in our country.” It is highly probable that the new “neighbors” Russia has carved in the regional struggle, may be considered as a lesson to be learned from for Russia’s “internal neighbors” right across the Caucasus range.
Fifth, it is not at all yet clear what orientation will Abkhazia take as a quasi-independent actor, but the probability of a small balancer seems to be met in time, as Abkhazia has already given incipient signs of viability, at least by regional standards. The successful elections it held a month ago, not at all in line with a scenario wanted in Moscow, stand as an eloquent example. Moreover, in view of a deeper EU involvement in the region, non-partisanship and an objective brokerage between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, the EU might be the only factor standing in the way to Russia’s de facto annexation, a fact to be already noticed by the Abkhazian elites.
Sixth, the 2014-2017 timeframe portends events of regional and even global importance. Obviously, the global one is the 2014 Winter Olympiad in Sochi, some mere 60 kilometers from Abkhazia’s capital Sukhumi. For Russia to be a success story and emulate the 2008 Chinese triumph that couldn’t but arouse the imagination of a symbolic great powerish re-affirmation of the Kremlin, it needs a stable geopolitical environment. To its detriment, the unfreezing of the conflicts on the Georgian territory added supplementary regional volatility while also bringing closer the nightmarish eventuality that the next regional flash point might be the so-called Crimean issue and intimately related to it - the fate of the Russian Black Sea fleet based in Sebastopol. In a dim scenario like this, it is not at all clear how a possibly militarized and vindictive Georgia could act.
Implications for the wider region
Although the actual perceptional epicenter of the regional dynamics is focused on Georgia, to all evidence Ukraine remains Russia’s most covetous long-term prize. Undoubtedly, the Russo-Georgian war had as its main effect not only the disruption of the Georgian Euro-Atlantic orientation, but Ukraine’s as well. The West’s strategic pause, caused among others by the global economic crisis, the prevalence of the Greater Middle East as the key securitized area and the avoidance of any substantial commitment after the August war, is not at all conducive towards avoiding a similar fate for Ukraine. If Georgia has been indispensable to meeting Russian foreign policy and security solutions and dropping hints to the rest of the region, then Ukraine is crucial to Russia’s further identity evolution, because it is among the few grand factors capable of transforming Russia in particular, and molding the region towards a security community in general, as phantasmagorical as this could seem now. Therefore, Georgia seems to be the way, Abkhazia, South-Osetia, Transnistria and Crimea are among the proven tools, and Ukraine’s strategic anomie is the prize.
Still, in the short run, the source of even greater trouble might be the situation around Karabah. It is this looming issue that maintains Georgia high afloat on the grand actors’ agenda. From this viewpoint, 2010 may be decisive in the Caucasus. If Turkey ratifies the bilateral protocols with Armenia without developing a solution to the Karabah conflict, Azerbaijan will surely reconsider its relations with Turkey and the West. Azerbaijan might not enthusiastically pursue the Nabucco pipeline construction and could refrain from participation in other regional projects. Moreover, ratification of the protocols will reinforce the negative public perception toward the West and Turkey, leading Azerbaijanis to believe that the military escalation is the sole solution for the Karabah conflict.
In a depressing scenario like this, Georgia might not seem such an undertaking for the West. Tbilisi could retrieve the situation by doing mainly three things - avoiding brinkmanship with Russia, enhancing its state capacity and reducing the democratic deficit, and, therefore, displaying regional viability for the main objects of its attractiveness: energy and military transit. Although, the energy, transport and military East-West corridor has been put under strain, together with the prospects as a primary regional transit hub for Central Asian energy, it remains the main alternative to Russia’s monopoly, and the commitment of the Central Eastern European states to the Nabucco pipeline implementation has brought new evidence to this argumentation. The conflict has brought incertitude and reluctance, but it has not produced a Western volte-face. The pipelines are there, and other are set to be built the next years, following the same pre-war route.
Thus, at the moment, any discussion about a regional identity is out of question and Russia has masterfully succeeded in precluding that. After the war, the concept of WBSA became even more prescriptive than based on the reality on the ground. On the regional scale, the post August war Russia poses serious questions to the West and to Georgia. For the West, whether it will accept its strategic default vis-à-vis Russia, and indulge in the idea that the post-Soviet space is a territory where Russia can effectively dictate without formally restoring its erstwhile empire and search for a 19th-century-like deal with the West as envisaged by its new pan-European security proposals, including the WBSA, where to Georgia a first resort role ought to be attributed. For Georgia, whether it retains de facto sovereignty and effective statehood, and weather it will be able to define for itself a role and a place in the new regional context.
http://www.georgica.net/analitic/?page=ru&id=305
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