The New American Strategy in Afghanistan Raises Concerns

Radu Alexandru CUCUTA
December, 6^th 2009

In a highly expected and rather predictable move, American President Barack Obama presented the public the enactment of the new US strategy for Afghanistan. The US is expected to increase its presence in the region by 30,000 soldiers (a figure the media had already advanced prior to the president’s announcement). The president’s announcement was followed by a similar statement of the NATO Secretary General, which outlined the European Allies’ commitment to assist in the US strategy, by enhancing their effective by 7,000 soldiers. The 37,000 man increase is still short of the 45,000 figure general McCrystal deemed necessary for fighting the Taliban insurgency with success. 

However, the most controversial part of the American strategy is the dead-line the president set for the foreign presence in Afghanistan. Obama envisioned that the surge will last for only 18 months, enough time to fight back the Taliban offensive and to ensure that the Afghan administration and security forces are capable of dealing themselves with the insurgency problem. The president’s strategy was criticized because of the tight schedule it envisions. Many politicians and observers consider that not only is 18 months a short time to root out a movement that has gone to great lengths to win popular support, but also that the faltering American commitment to fighting the war in Afghanistan is only going to bolster support for the Islamic militants. 

The administration’s first response was that the July 2011 date is not a deadline for the American presence in Afghanistan – the spokesmen of the White House underlined that by 2011 the Afghan administration and security forces are expected to start to take-over from the international forces the responsibilities of law-enforcement and counter-insurgency fighting. Although the 18-months threshold may not be a fixed date the US forces will upheld (since a retreat-calendar has not yet been issued), it is certain that the move is a powerful signal to the Karzai administration. In spite of the Afghan president’s subsequent appeal to patience, the US message is clear – Karzai’s administration, already plagued by corruption accusations and electoral fraud allegations, has run out of blank cheques. The success of the counter-insurgency strategy depends on the capacity of the Afghan government to perform its political functions to the full extent. 

Last but not least, the strategy’s weakest point is the way it concentrates on denying the Talibans access to the urban areas. Though these are in perspective the most vulnerable positions, the insurgency is concentrated mainly outside these areas controlled by coalition forces. Trying to repeat the Iraq successful strategy in a different environment may prove a problem in itself. Furthermore, there were no hints at a cooperation between Pakistani military forces and NATO units, making the problem of Pashtun-area located safe-heavens even more problematic.