Leaving the Future Open for a Reluctant Russia
Radu Alexandru CUCUTA
January 22, 2010
Carnegie’s recent Policy Brief – “(Re)Engaging Russia in an Era of Uncertainty” by Samuel A. Greene and Dmitri Trenin – is just one of the most recent analyses tackling the political future of Russia. There are several key-arguments that are common-place when discussing Russian politics. The centralized nature of the regime, the lack of internal political competition and the lack of a free media and a strong civil society are the main ingredient of criticism when it comes to the political performance of the Kremlin. Furthermore, as in the case of the Carnegie Policy Brief, the closed political system is considered a key reason for the economic hardship Russia suffers. One has to make the point that amongst the (re)emerging powers, the BRIC nations, Russia is by far one of the least troubled. Both India and China lack democratic credentials, but that does not prevent analysts of heralding their triumph in the economic field. The “original” regime Vladimir Putin has put into place is far from democratic standards, but its economic performance and the way in which it will steer Russia through the economic hardship remains yet to be seen (though one has to admit, as Greene and Trenin show, the perspectives are not a cause for rejoice).
The main argument the authors make lies not in their analysis of the economic or the political system – the main critical arguments used in recent works on Russian foreign policy, but in the importance they give to the mechanisms of evaluation and analysis the Kremlin is lacking. Having developed a very centralized government has made governing Russia easy for the present leadership, but it has prevented the emergence of intermediate levels of expertise. Describing a phenomenon similar to Irvin Janis’ “groupthink”, the two researchers show the scale and the depth of the transformation. The gravest mistakes in recent years – the war with Georgia, the recognition of Ossetian and Abhazian independence, and the botched-up attempt of welfare reform – stem directly from the nature of the regime, who lacks a critical insight into foreign policies and who is facing in the second decade of the 21st century a new international environment.
Similarly, Russia’s lackluster avoidance of the new international arrangements is not purely the result of a hard-line interpretation of Russian national interests, but the consequence of seeing the world through a different lens – one that is to get more and more antiquated as time passes by. The inability of Russian leaders to understand the new global environment (and the responsibilities that Russia has to undertake, as a major power and a prominent member of the international community) is also a direct consequence of a slackening intellectual environment (in the author’s terms, Russia has become “intellectually provincial).
Greene and Trenin envision that international relations are going through a period of profound change that the West is capable of fuelling, both in terms of power and in terms of knowledge and information. Russia’s reluctance to be part of the new international arrangements (concerning financial regulations or pollution-prevention) should not determine the other international actors to close the door on Moscow (a move that may lead to a resurgence of nationalism). Once Russia will face outward, after overcoming its internal difficulties, it can be a part of the new global governance mechanisms, provided it can reform its internal institutions. As to the mechanisms through which that should occur, the authors see a prominent role for the Russian civil society, whose expertise and frequent contacts with their western counterparts should force the government to open up and become more transparent.
Radu Alexandru CUCUTA
January 22, 2010
Carnegie’s recent Policy Brief – “(Re)Engaging Russia in an Era of Uncertainty” by Samuel A. Greene and Dmitri Trenin – is just one of the most recent analyses tackling the political future of Russia. There are several key-arguments that are common-place when discussing Russian politics. The centralized nature of the regime, the lack of internal political competition and the lack of a free media and a strong civil society are the main ingredient of criticism when it comes to the political performance of the Kremlin. Furthermore, as in the case of the Carnegie Policy Brief, the closed political system is considered a key reason for the economic hardship Russia suffers. One has to make the point that amongst the (re)emerging powers, the BRIC nations, Russia is by far one of the least troubled. Both India and China lack democratic credentials, but that does not prevent analysts of heralding their triumph in the economic field. The “original” regime Vladimir Putin has put into place is far from democratic standards, but its economic performance and the way in which it will steer Russia through the economic hardship remains yet to be seen (though one has to admit, as Greene and Trenin show, the perspectives are not a cause for rejoice).
The main argument the authors make lies not in their analysis of the economic or the political system – the main critical arguments used in recent works on Russian foreign policy, but in the importance they give to the mechanisms of evaluation and analysis the Kremlin is lacking. Having developed a very centralized government has made governing Russia easy for the present leadership, but it has prevented the emergence of intermediate levels of expertise. Describing a phenomenon similar to Irvin Janis’ “groupthink”, the two researchers show the scale and the depth of the transformation. The gravest mistakes in recent years – the war with Georgia, the recognition of Ossetian and Abhazian independence, and the botched-up attempt of welfare reform – stem directly from the nature of the regime, who lacks a critical insight into foreign policies and who is facing in the second decade of the 21st century a new international environment.
Similarly, Russia’s lackluster avoidance of the new international arrangements is not purely the result of a hard-line interpretation of Russian national interests, but the consequence of seeing the world through a different lens – one that is to get more and more antiquated as time passes by. The inability of Russian leaders to understand the new global environment (and the responsibilities that Russia has to undertake, as a major power and a prominent member of the international community) is also a direct consequence of a slackening intellectual environment (in the author’s terms, Russia has become “intellectually provincial).
Greene and Trenin envision that international relations are going through a period of profound change that the West is capable of fuelling, both in terms of power and in terms of knowledge and information. Russia’s reluctance to be part of the new international arrangements (concerning financial regulations or pollution-prevention) should not determine the other international actors to close the door on Moscow (a move that may lead to a resurgence of nationalism). Once Russia will face outward, after overcoming its internal difficulties, it can be a part of the new global governance mechanisms, provided it can reform its internal institutions. As to the mechanisms through which that should occur, the authors see a prominent role for the Russian civil society, whose expertise and frequent contacts with their western counterparts should force the government to open up and become more transparent.
